The evolution of social and economic networks

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 265-295

  Jackson, Matthew O ^b   Watts, Alison ^a  

^a SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution; Networks; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036816721     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2903     Document Type: Article

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