The informal game theory in hume's account of convention

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 215-247

  Vanderschraaf, Peter ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85012471818     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100003849     Document Type: Article

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