Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 69, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 407-428

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042378561     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/342451     Document Type: Article

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