Stability and explanatory significance of some simple evolutionary models

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 94-112

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041780133     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/392763     Document Type: Article

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