Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 65-92

  Robson, Arthur J ^a   Vega Redondo, Fernando ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030194779     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0076     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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