Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 1323-1340

  Blume, Andreas ^a   DeJong, Douglas V ^b   Kim, Yong Gwan ^c   Sprinkle, Geoffrey B ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^c Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006734670     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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