A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 286-298

  Crawford, Vincent ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000091971     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2359     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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