Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-24

  Banerjee, Abhijit ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Coordination games; cheap talk games; evolutionary stability; neutral stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006698772     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0756     Document Type: Article

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