Believing For a Reason

Erkenntnis

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 383-397

  Turri, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953716782     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9271-5     Document Type: Article

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