Doxastic freedom

Synthese

Volumn 161, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 375-392

  Steup, Matthias ^a  

^a ST CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949180218     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9090-4     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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15. Steup, M. (2000). Doxastic voluntarism and epistemic deontology. Acta Analytica, 15, 25-56. Pre-print available on-line at http://web.stcloudstate. edu/msteup/Epis.html#LIN
16. Steup M. (2001). Knowledge, truth, and duty. Oxford, Oxford University Press
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