Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 106, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 309-338

  Goldman, Alvin I ^a  

^a Ctr for Global Secty Democr   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349798263     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2009106611     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. See D.M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (New York: Cambridge, 1973)
2. See William P. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," Philosophical Topics, xiv (1986): 179-221
3. and "An Internalist Externalism," Synihese, lxxiv (1988): 265-83
4. Michael Bergmann, Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism (New York: Oxford, 2006)
5. Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge," in Peter French, Thomas Uehling, Jr., and Howard Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 5, Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1980), pp. 53-73
6. Juan Comesana, "We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now," in John Hawthorne, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 19, Epistemology (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 59-76
7. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (New York: Oxford, 2004)
8. Richard Fumerton, "The Internalism/Externalism Controversy," in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 2, Epistemology (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988), pp. 443-61
9. and Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995)
10. Carl Ginet, Knowledge, Perception and Memory (Boston: Reidel, 1975)
11. Alvin I. Goldman, "The Internalist Conception of Justification," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 5, Studies in Epistemology, pp. 27-52
12. Hilary Kornblith, "How Internal Can You Get'" Synthese, lxxiv (1988): 313-27
13. and Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford, 1993)
14. rd edition, pp. 59-60
15. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," reprinted in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989), p. 192
16. Kent Bach writes: "Internalism ... treats justifiedness as a purely internal matter: if p is justified for S, then S must be aware (or at least be immediately capable of being aware) of what makes it justified and why" - "A Rationale for Reliabilism," The Monist, lxvii (1985): 246-63, p. 250
17. See Conee and Feldman, "Internalism Defended," in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (New York: Oxford, 2004), pp. 53-80, on p. 55
18. See Feldman and Conee, "Afterword to 'Evidentialism,'" in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, pp. 101-07, on p. 101 (emphasis added). Note that this quotation occurs in a recent statement of their position
19. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (New York: Oxford, 2000)
20. See Goldman, "Internalism Exposed," and Comesana, "We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now."
21. nd edition)
22. Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Lxxx (1999): 346-57
23. See Michael Bergmann, "Externalism and Skepticism," Philosophical Review, cix (2000): 159-94
24. Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, p. 37
25. Fumerton, Meta-epislemology and Skepticism, p. 180
26. Stroud, "Understanding Human Knowledge in General," in M. Clay and K. Lehrer, eds., Knowledge and Skepticism (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 31-50
27. Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 127-96
28. Not long after incorporating these examples into this paper, I heard Susanna Siegel present a paper with similar examples, many of which she also considered to involve unjustified belief. See Siegel, "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" (unpublished, Harvard University)
29. Thanks to Jack Lyons for suggesting these examples. His Perception and Basic Beliefs (New York: Oxford, 2009) provides an illuminating and subtle analysis of closely related issues
30. Conee and Feldman's supervenience principle S reads as follows: "The justificatory status of a person's doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person's occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions" ("Internalism Defended," p. 56). This principle does not explicitly restrict the supervenience base to states occurring at the same time as the doxastic attitudes in question. Another recent statement of theirs, however, quoted above in note 6, indicates that they do intend this restriction
31. Foley, A Theory of Epislemic Rationality (Cambridge: Harvard, 1987)