Greco on knowledge: Virtues, contexts, achievements

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 58, Issue 232, 2008, Pages 437-447

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949342705     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.550.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. In contrast, for example, with Linda Zagzebski, who offers a very restrictive account of the cognitive abilities relevant to knowledge possession. See, e.g., L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge UP, 1996)
2. See, e.g., J. Greco, 'Agent Reliabilism', Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), pp. 273-96
3. and Putting Sceptics in their Place (Cambridge UP, 2000)
4. Greco's attributor contextualism is very different from standard varieties: see, e.g., K. DeRose, 'Solving the Skeptical Problem', Philosophical Review, 104 (1994), pp. 1-52
5. D. Lewis, 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1995), pp. 549-67
6. S. Cohen, 'Contextualism and Scepticism', Philosophical Issues, 10 (2000), pp. 94-107. On Greco's view the relevant context need not be the attributor's, thus allowing for some of the intuitions behind the subject-sensitive invariantist view defended by Hawthorne and Stanley
7. See J. Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford UP, 2004)
8. and J. Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford UP, 2005). Since Greco's view does allow the attributor's context to be the relevant context, I think it is acceptable to describe his view as a form of attributor contextualism, so I shall henceforth call it this without qualification
9. For more on safety, see E. Sosa, 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (2000), pp. 141-54
10. D. Pritchard, 'Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10 (2002), pp. 283-307
11. Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005), ch. 6
12. and 'Anti-Luck Epistemology', Synthese, 156 (2007), pp. 277-97
13. See, e.g., Greco, 'Knowledge as Credit for True Belief', in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds), Intellectual Virtue (Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 111-34, and 'The Value Problem', in A. Haddock, A. Millar and D.H. Pritchard (eds), The Value of Knowledge (Oxford UP, forthcoming)
14. For further discussion, see D. Pritchard, 'Recent Work on Epistemic Value', American Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2007), pp. 85-110, §4
15. 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited', Metaphilosophy, 38 (2008), pp. 66-88; 'Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value', in A. O'Hear (ed.), Epistemology (Cambridge UP, forthcoming)
16. Greco, 'What's Wrong With Contextualism?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (2008)
17. (this issue), pp. 416-36, at p. 420
18. S. Rieber, 'Scepticism and Contrastive Explanation', Noûs, 32 (1998), pp. 189-204, at p. 195
19. For another prominent example of a contrastivist treatment of causal explanation, see P. Lipton, 'Contrastive Explanation', in D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits (Cambridge UP, 1990), pp. 247-66
20. F. Dretske, 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 1007-23
21. See, for example, J. Schaffer, 'Contrastive Knowledge', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 1 (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 235-72
22. I explore further the problem posed by barn-façade-style cases for Greco's view elsewhere. See, e.g., my 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited' and 'Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value'. See also J. Kvanvig, 'Responses to Critics', in Haddock, Millar and Pritchard (eds), The Value of Knowledge
23. J. Lackey, 'Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know', Synthese, 156 (2007), pp. 345-61, §2
24. I discuss them further elsewhere. See, e.g., 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited' and 'Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value'