Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge

Epistemic Value

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Goldman, Alvin I ^a   Olsson, Erik J ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Conditional probability; Naturalized epistemology; Reliabilism; Swaping problem; Type instrumentalism; Value autonomization; Value of knowledge; Virtue epistemology; Weak knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921812929     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

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