The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality

Philosophical Review

Volumn 109, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 373-409

  Nelkin, Dana K ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039289587     PISSN: 00318108     EISSN: 15581470     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-109-3-373     Document Type: Article

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