Motivation in agents

Nous

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 222-266

  Miller, Christian ^a  

^a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949358490     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x     Document Type: Article

References (130)

1. Altham, J. E. J. (1986). "The Legacy of Emotivism," in Fact, Science and Morality. Ed. Mac-donald and Wright. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Audi, Robert. (1986a). "Acting for Reasons." The Philosophical Review 95. Reprinted in Audi 1993b: 145-178.
3. -. (1986b). "Belief, Reason, and Inference." Philosophical Topics 14. Reprinted in Audi 1993a: 233-273.
4. -. (1993a). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. -. (1993b). Action, Intention, and Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
6. -. (1993c). "Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic," in Heil and Mele 1993: 53-74.
7. -. (1997). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. -. (2001). The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Baker, Lynne Rudder. (1993). "Metaphysics and Mental Causation," in Heil and Mele 1993: 75-95.
10. Bennett, Jonathan. (1988). Events and Their Names. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
11. Bishop, John. (1989). Natural Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Bransen, Jan and Stefaan Cuypers (Eds.). (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
13. Bratman, Michael. (1996). "Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason." Philosophical Topics 24. Reprinted in Bratman 1999: 185-206.
14. -. (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. -. (2000a). "Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency." The Philosophical Review 109: 35-61.
16. -. (2000b). "Valuing and the Will." Philosophical Perspectives 14: 249-265.
17. -. (2002). "Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction," in Buss and Overton 2002: 65-85.
18. -. (2003). "A Desire of One's Own." The Journal of Philosophy 100: 221-242.
19. -. (2005). "Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency," in Taylor 2005: 33-57.
20. Buss, Sarah and Lee Overton (Ed.). (2002). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge: MIT Press.
21. Clark, Philip. (2000). "What Goes without Saying in Metaethics." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 357-379.
22. Collins, John. (1988). "Belief, Desire, and Revision." Mind 97: 333-342.
23. Crane, Tim. (1992). "Mental Causation and Mental Reality." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 185-202.
24. Cuneo, Terence. (2002). "Reconciling Realism with Humeanism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80: 465-486.
25. Dancy, Jonathan. (1993). Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
26. -. (1995). "Why There is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 1-18.
27. -. (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28. -. (2003). "Replies." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 468-490.
29. Darwall, Stephen. (1983). Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
30. Davidson, Donald. (1963). "Actions, Reasons, and Causes." The Journal of Philosophy 60. Reprinted in Davidson 1980: 3-20.
31. -. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
32. Davis, Wayne. (2005). "Reasons and Psychological Causes." Philosophical Studies 122: 51-101.
33. Ekstrom, Laura. (2005). "Autonomy and Personal Integration," in Taylor 2005: 143-161
34. Evans, Gareth. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
35. Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza. (1993). Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
36. Fodor, Jerry. (1976). The Language of Thought. Hassocks: Harvester Press.
37. -. (1986). "Individualism and Supervenience." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60: 235-262.
38. -. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
39. Foley, Richard. (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
40. -. (2002). "Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology," in Moser 2002: 177-203.
41. Frankfurt, Harry. (1971). "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988a: 11-25.
42. -. (1975). "Three Concepts of Free Action." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988: 47-57.
43. -. (1977). "Identification and Externality," in The Identities of Persons. Ed. A. Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988: 58-68.
44. -. (1987). "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Ed. F Schoeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988: 159-176.
45. -. (1988). The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
46. -. (1992). "The Faintest Passion." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66: 5-16. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1999: 95-107.
47. -. (1993). "On the Necessity of Ideals," in The Moral Self. Ed. G. Noam and T. Wren. Cambridge: MIT Press. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1999: 108-116.
48. -. (1999). Volition, Necessity, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49. -. (2002a). "Reply to Michael Bratman," in Buss and Overton 2002: 86-90.
50. Garrard, Eve and David McNaughton. (1998). "Mapping Moral Motivation." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1: 45-59.
51. Ginet, Carl. (1990). On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52. Heil, John. (1998). Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge.
53. Heil, John and Alfred Mele. (Eds.). (1993). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
54. Helm, Bennett. (2001). "Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation." Noûs 35: 190-213.
55. Humberstone, I. L. (1992). "Direction of Fit." Mind 101: 59-83.
56. Hutto, Daniel. (2004). "The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology." Mind & Language 19: 548-573.
57. Jackson, Frank. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
58. Jacob, Pierre. (1992). "Externalism and Mental Causation." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 203-219.
59. Kane, Robert. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
60. Kim, Jaegwon. (1989). "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 63. Reprinted in Kim 1993: 265-284.
61. -. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
62. -. (1996). Philosophy of Mind. Boulder: Westview Press.
63. -. (1998). "Reasons and the First Person," in Bransen and Cuypers 1998: 67-87.
64. Lewis, David. (1988). "Desire as Belief." Mind 97: 323-332.
65. -. (1996). "Desire as Belief II." Mind 105: 303-313.
66. Lenman, James. (1996). "Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics." American Philosophical Quarterly 33: 291-301.
67. Little, Margaret. (1997). "Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind." Noûs 31: 59-79.
68. Lowe, E. J. (2000). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
69. Manson, Neil C. (2004). "Reason Explanation: A First-Order Rationalizing Account." Philosophical Explorations 7: 113-129.
70. McDowell, John. (1978). "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 52. Reprinted in McDowell 1998: 77-94.
71. -. (1979). "Virtue and Reason." The Monist 62. Reprinted in McDowell 1998: 50-73.
72. -. (1998). Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
73. McNaughton, David. (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
74. Mele, Alfred. (1996). "Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness." Ethics 106: 727-753.
75. -. (2003). Motivation and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
76. Mellor, D. H. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
77. Miller, Alexander. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.
78. Miller, Christian. (2004). Agency and Moral Realism. Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Notre Dame.
79. -. (2005). "Defeaters and the Basicality of Theistic Belief," in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology. Ed. R. Rood et al. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. 147-176.
80. -. (2007a). "The Policy-Based Approach to Identification." Philosophical Psychology 20: 105-125.
81. -. (2007b). "Identifying with our Desires." Under Review.
82. -. (2007c). "Impossibilities of the Will." Under Review.
83. Moser, Paul. (Ed.). (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
84. Nagel, Thomas. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
85. Olson, Eric. (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
86. Parfit, Derek. (1997). "Reasons and Motivation." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement. 71: 99-130.
87. -. (forthcoming). Practical Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
88. Pettit, Philip. (1987). "Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation." Mind 96: 530-533.
89. Pettit, Philip and Huw Price. (1989). "Bare Functional Desire." Analysis 49: 162-169.
90. Pettit, Philip and Michael Smith. (1990). "Backgrounding Desire." Philosophical Review 99.
91. Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. Ed. F. Jackson, P. Pettit, and M. Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. 269-294.
92. Platts, Mark. (1980). "Moral Reality and the End of Desire," in Reference, Truth and Reality. Ed. Mark Platts. London: Routledge. 69-82.
93. Price, Huw. (1989). "Defending Desire-as-Belief." Mind 98: 119-127.
94. Searle, John R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
95. -. (2001). Rationality in Action. Cambridge: MIT Press.
96. Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
97. Schueler, G. F. (1991). "Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit." Mind 100: 277-281.
98. -. (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. Cambridge: MIT Press.
99. Sehon, Scott. (1997). "Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 195-213.
100. Setiya, Kieran. (2003). "Explaining Action." The Philosophical Review 112: 339-393.
101. Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2000). "A Defense of Motivational Externalism." Philosophical Studies 97:267-291.
102. -. (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
103. Smith, Michael. (1987). "The Humean Theory of Motivation." Mind 96: 36-61.
104. -. (1988). "On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit." Mind 97: 589-595.
105. -. (1989). "Dispositional Theories of Value." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 89-111.
106. -. (1994). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
107. -. (1998). "The Possibility of Philosophy of Action," in Bransen and Cuypers 1998: 17-41.
108. -. (2003). "Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story." Philosophy and Phe-nomenological Research 67: 460-467.
109. Sobel, David and David Copp. (2001). "Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire." Analysis 61: 44-53.
110. Stocker, Michael. (1979). "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology." The Journal of Philosophy 76: 738-753.
111. Stoutland, Frederick. (1998). "The Real Reasons," in Bransen and Cuypers 1998: 43-66.
112. Stump, Eleonore. (1988). "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will." The Journal of Philosophy 85. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 1993: 211-234.
113. -. (1990). "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Ed. M. Beaty. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 1993: 237-262.
114. Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún. (1999). "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation." The Philosophical Review 108: 161-219.
115. Taylor, James (Ed.). (2005). Personal Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
116. van Gulick, Robert. (1993). "Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?" in Heil and Mele 1993: 233-256.
117. van Roojen, Mark. (1995). "Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality." Philosophical Studies 79: 37-57.
118. -. (2002). "Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 26-49.
119. Velleman, J. David. (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
120. -. (1992). "What Happens When Someone Acts?" Mind 101. Reprinted in Velleman 2000a: 123-144.
121. -. (2000a). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
122. Wallace, R. Jay. (2003). "Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons." Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research 67: 429-435.
123. -. (2005). "Moral Psychology," in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Ed. Frank Jackson and Michael Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
124. Watson, Gary. (1987). Free Action and Free Will. Mind, 96, 145-172.
125. Williams, Bernard. (1980). "Internal and External Reasons," in Rational Action. Ed. Ross Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Williams 1981. 101-113.
126. -. (1981). Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
127. -. (1995a). Making Sense of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
128. -. (1995b). "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame." Reprinted in Williams 1995a. 35-45.
129. Wilson, George. (1989). The Intentionality of Human Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
130. Zangwill, Nick. (1998). "Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism." Philosophical Studies 91: 173-203.