Can we do without pragmatic encroachment?

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 417-443

  Weatherson, Brian ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845708352     PISSN: 15208583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00068.x     Document Type: Article

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