Rationality, justification, and the internalism/externalism debate

Erkenntnis

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 79-101

  Langsam, Harold ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Deliberation; Externalism; Internalism; Justification; Rational intuition; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749037694     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-007-9059-9     Document Type: Article

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