How knowledge works

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 197, 1999, Pages 433-451

  Hyman, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 23344434074     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00152     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. On this topic, see B.A.O. Williams, 'Knowledge and Reasons', in G.H. von Wright (ed.), Problems in the Theory of Knowledge (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), p. 3
2. G. Ryle, 'Knowing How and Knowing That', in Collected Papers, Vol. 11 (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), pp. 212-25
3. The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), ch. 2
4. Detailed and sceptical treatments of the distinction, to which I am indebted in this paragraph, can be found in D.G. Brown, 'Knowing How and Knowing That, What', in O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds), Ryle (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 213-48
5. and A.R. White, The Nature of Knowledge (Tatowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), ch. 2
6. see also Republic 476-9
7. Some writers who argue that 'A knows that p' implies that A believes that p nevertheless concede that knowledge is not a species of belief. No inconsistency is involved in this position. See, e.g., R.M. Chisholm, Perceiving (Cornell UP, 1957), pp. 17-18
8. E.L. Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23 (1963), pp. 121-3
9. R.K Shope's The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton UP, 1983) is a Herculean confirmation that work on Gettier's problem was, at the time of publication, inconclusive at best
10. See, e.g., E. Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford UP, 1990)
11. T. Williamson, 'Is Knowing a State of Mind?', Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 533-63
12. See, e.g., M. Kaplan, 'It's Not What You Know That Counts', Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1985), pp. 354-6
13. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), §150
14. The Concept of Mind p. 129
15. J. Margolis, 'Knowledge, Belief and Thought', Ratio, 14 (1972), pp. 74-82
16. White, The Nature of Knowledge ch. 6
17. Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature, passim
18. Cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §586
19. A.J.P. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind (Oxford UP, 1989), pp. 108-9
20. P.F. Strawson, 'Truth', repr. in his Logico-Linguistic Papers (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 190-213, at p. 196
21. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford UP, 1980), p. 12
22. G.H. von Wright, Practical Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 54
23. but cf. his 'Of Human Freedom', in In the Shadow of Descartes (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 10-11
24. R. Audi, Action, Intention and Reason (Cornell UP, 1993), pp. 15-16
25. J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn (Princeton UP, 1990), p. 17
26. Strawson, 'Perception and its Objects', repr. in J. Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1988), pp. 92-112, at p. 94
27. J. Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p. 25. The example is attributed to Brian Garrett
28. It has appeared obvious to some. Prichard, for example, saw no need to argue for it: '[according to a certain view about duties] we can never, strictly speaking, do a duty, if we have one, because it is a duty, i.e., really in consequence of knowing it to be a duty.... At best, if we have a duty, we may do it because we think without question, or else believe, or again think it possible that the act is a duty': 'Duty and Ignorance of Fact', repr. in H. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 18-39, at p. 24
29. See, for example, Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind pp. 37-8
30. J. Annas and J. Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge UP, 1985), pp. 47-8
31. Cf. R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (London: Duckworth, 1993), ch. 7
32. The story is told by Philo, On Animals 45-6
33. and by Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1 §69
34. D. Davidson, 'Thought and Talk', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford UP, 1984), pp. 155-70