Our [National] federalism

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 123, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1996-2043

  Gluck, Abbe R ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84898650545     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (310)

1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (coining the "slogan" of "Our Federalism").
2. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 (2005).
3. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
4. William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23 (2009).
5. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008).
6. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
7. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
8. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1377-86 (2001).
9. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 828-32 (1957).
10. Arguing that federal judges have discretion to, and often should, choose state law to fill gaps in federal schemes.
11. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559-60 (1954).
12. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J 1920 (2014).
13. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 515-16 (2007).
14. Schapiro, supra note 2, at 248.
15. Buzbee, supra note 4.
16. Super, supra note 4.
17. Waxman, supra note 4.
18. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011), which applies bargaining theory to state-federal administrative relationships.
19. infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
20. I have previously detailed this federal-centricity in legislation theory and doctrine. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation].
21. Gluck, supra note 3.
22. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010).
23. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (presenting the results of the largest empirical study to date of congressional staff statutory drafting practices and knowledge of the rules of statutory interpretation).
24. Constitution-implementing doctrines like the tiers of scrutiny, the Commerce Clause test, and the various tests for implementing the First Amendment are understood as precedents that receive stare decisis effect. See Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15, at 1915-16. Some call these doctrines constitutional law, others call them "constitutional common law," but no one disputes that they are "law."
25. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001).
26. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9, 167 (2004).
27. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975).
28. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15.
29. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).
30. This essay's use of the term "federalism's domain" and its fifteen unresolved doctrinal questions aim to evoke Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman's outstanding article, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001), which took the doctrinal pulse of Chevron at a critical moment.
31. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
32. Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
34. In nine of those cases, "federalism" was invoked only by concurring or dissenting Justices.
35. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that states could not be required to enforce federal regulatory programs).
36. Two of the cases involved federal habeas law-federal statutory law that includes deference to state procedures for "federalism" reasons. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
37. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). Three others involved the construction of specific state powers under federal statutes-the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)-that indisputably already displace much other state law. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2013) (FMLA).
38. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (VRA).
39. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (PLRA). The most "classic" use of sovereignty was in McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013), a case about the rights accorded to out-of-state citizens under Virginia's own freedom of information law. See also S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2361 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invoking sovereignty to argue that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 533 U.S. 466 (2000), should not apply to criminal fines because states should have power to control judicial discretion on matters of criminal justice). The final case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), gave short shrift-as Justice Kennedy argued in dissent, see id. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)-to arguments that states, as sovereigns, should be able to determine who has standing to bring challenges to state law, even in federal courts.
40. Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013).
41. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013).
42. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
43. Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013).
44. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012).
45. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).
46. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
47. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
48. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
49. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
50. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
51. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011). One additional case, Astrue v. Caputo ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), invoked preemption with regard to the choice between a state-or federal-law definition of an unclear statutory term.
52. id. at 2030, 2032.
53. Another concerned the preemptive effect of an interstate compact. See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013).
54. This list was produced by a search of the Westlaw Supreme Court Case Database for any cases decided between Oct. 1, 2010 and June 30, 2013 containing the terms "federalism," preempt!," "nationalism," "nationalist," or "Erie," or not containing one of those terms but containing the terms "sovereign!," "state law," or "spending clause." For cases containing the term "sovereign!" a research assistant extracted only those cases discussing state (rather than international) sovereignty. For cases containing the term "spending clause," I extracted only those cases discussing Spending Clause legislation involving states.
55. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old- Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1753-65 (2013).
56. Gluck, supra note 3, at 566-68.
57. Many others have lamented traditional federalism's shortcomings at experimentation. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 552 (2008).
58. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610-11 (1980).
59. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925-26 (1994).
60. Super, supra note 4.
61. For the classic statement of this "federalism" value, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.").
62. 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58.
63. Ryan Lizza, Romney's Dilemma, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2011, at 38, 40.
64. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1974).
65. Young, supra note 5.
66. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, NAT'L REV., Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/334956/yes-state-exchanges-douglas-holtz-eakin.
67. Young, supra note 5, at 1385.
68. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
69. id. at 2666-67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2660.
71. Id. at 2578 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added).
72. SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998) (discussing Old Age Assistance and Aid to Dependent Children programs).
73. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2007) (discussing environmental legislation).
74. Gluck, supra note 3 (discussing health care legislation).
75. Congress has also established a variety of statutory schemes that build in deference to state procedures, such as the Anti-Injunction Act, which restricts federal power to enjoin statecourt proceedings. Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012)). My primary interest here, however, is with the substantive-law manifestations of National Federalism.
76. This is not just a modern phenomenon. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1649-50 (2007) (documenting cooperative federalism in the early republic). But its pervasiveness and its emergence at least in part as a response to the aggrandizement of the national statutory state is a modern occurrence.
77. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: "The Political Safeguards" of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1947 (2008) (arguing that judicially created doctrines like Erie "help shape the identity, integrity, and autonomy of state law).
78. David McGrath Schwartz, Sandoval Takes Moderate Approach to Health Care Law, LAS VEGAS SUN (July 14, 2012), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jul/14/sandoval -takes-moderate-approach-health-care-law ("Nevada 'must also plan for a health insurance exchange so that we-and not the federal government-control the program,' [Gov.] Sandoval said....").
79. infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
80. Ernest Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) (arguing that these kinds of statutory moves are constitutive of constitutional understandings).
81. Scholars have focused on two types of legal questions raised by these incorporated laws- how federal courts should ascertain the state law in question and whether these hybrid statutes give rise to state or federal court jurisdiction, or both-but not on the federalism considerations that might lead to this form of statutory design in the first place.
82. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1935-47 (2003).
83. Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2011).
84. Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824-25, 842-47 (2011).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 203(v)-(w) (2012).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1) (2012).
88. Wayne A. Logan, Creating A "Hydra in Government": Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 84-101 (2006).
89. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20-29 (2008) (calling this phenomenon "decentralization," not federalism).
90. Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254.
91. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001).
92. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 518 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
93. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6 (1999).
94. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
95. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1371 (2001) (arguing that "gridlock" supports federalism norms because it prevents federal legislation).
96. Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 775 (2008).
97. Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 577 (1983) (discussing the decrease in state autonomy, by virtue of the diminished role of state courts, caused by expansive constructions of federal-court jurisdiction).
98. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
99. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 384-85 (2008).
100. JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009).
101. Resnik, supra note 57, at 749-51.
102. Young, supra note 51, at 272-74 (arguing that the presumption should also be understood to apply to the scope of preemption).
103. Gluck, supra note 3, at 553-64.
104. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256-57 (2013).
105. id. at 2260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
106. Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2052 (2011).
107. id. at 2056 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
108. CSX Transp., Inc. v Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2011).
109. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
110. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
111. Id. at 2691.
112. Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
114. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2620 (2013).
115. Id. at 2618.
116. id. at 2621, 2622, 2624, 2630 (same).
117. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011).
118. id. at 2790.
119. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
120. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1732 (2009) (cataloguing savings clauses across the U.S. Code and arguing that narrow construction of such clauses "undermines congressional policy in... federal-state relations").
121. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
122. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 112-18 (2011) (arguing that the Court gave the statute a preemptive meaning that Congress likely never intended).
123. Ryan v. Schad, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013).
124. McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013).
125. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
126. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
127. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
128. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
129. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
130. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) (discussing the interplay between cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and habeas).
131. id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[P]rinciples of federalism and comity are at stake when federal courts review state collateral review procedures." (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).
132. Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278 (2011).
133. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
134. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
135. A search of the Westlaw database for articles in which the terms AEDPA and cooperative federalism appeared two times each produced just three articles, none of which engaged the issue.
136. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401. AEDPA is layered atop the Court's own federalism-respecting common law habeas regime, which also plays a role in many cases. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (primarily concerned with application of the judicially created doctrines).
137. Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (same). But see Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that AEDPA is mostly symbolic legislation).
138. 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013).
139. Id. at 1402.
140. Id. at 1403-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 1408.
142. 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011). The main question in the case was whether an independent state agency created to implement a federal statute could sue state officials for violations of federal law in federal court.
143. Id. at 1641.
144. Id. at 1641 n.7 (citing id. at 1644 (Kennedy, J., concurring) and raising the question).
145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1002, 124 Stat. 119, 138 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
146. State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research /health/health-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx (last updated Sept. 2013) (observing that some state regulators lack the resources or legal authority to adequately report on premium increases).
147. States Implement Health Reform: Premium Rate Reviews, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/HRPremium.pdf [hereinafter Premium Rate Reviews].
148. Robert Pear & Kevin Sack, Some States Are Lacking in Health Law Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/health/policy/15insure.html. Premium Rate Reviews, supra note 88.
149. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). A post-argument change in procedural posture occasioned by the agency's formal approval of California's decision simplified the original question in the case, which concerned whether a private right of action could be implied under the Supremacy Clause for a citizen suit alleging that the state implementation conflicted with federal law.
150. id. at 1207.
151. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
152. 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
153. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)).
154. Id. at 2603, 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
155. Id. at 2606.
156. Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 328 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
158. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2007).
159. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).
160. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15, at 1924-50.
161. Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer, Note, Curing the Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for State Agencies Implementing Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280, 1295-306 (2013).
162. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15.
163. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990). For areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, see, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012), which discusses federal criminal prosecutions, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1334, 1338 (2012), which discuss admiralty, bankruptcy, and intellectual property, respectively.
164. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 58, at 574-75.
165. This, too, is a federalism that Congress could take away, by taking more cases out of the hands of state courts.
166. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-03 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
167. id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
168. Gluck, supra note 3, at 564-74.
169. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 154-55, 157 (1999) (documenting an increase in delegations toward the states in times of divided government).
170. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2089 (2014) (arguing that federalism was viewed in the early years of the nation as a strategy for creating a union).
171. Nationalism is mentioned only in cases about the expansion of federal court jurisdiction after the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), or in the context of free speech (protecting views about nationalism) and in a few cases about pacifists and asylum.
172. Nationalism tends to be mentioned in law reviews only in the context of international law or as a justification for legislation under the Commerce Clause.
173. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010).
174. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 150, 164-65 (2010).
175. Mishkin, supra note 6, at 811-14.
176. Id. at 825-26.
177. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 58, at 566-74.
178. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10, at 1946 (discussing states as staging grounds for partisan debates).
179. NUGENT, supra note 61.
180. Resnik, supra note 57, at 776-80.
181. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 228-33, 240-43 (2010). 115.
182. id. at 209-253.
183. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2100 (2014) ("[N]ational debates can happen trans-locally with or without the federal government in the lead.").
184. An Act Concerning Genetically-Engineered Food §3(a), 2013 Conn. Acts ch. 183.
185. An Act to Protect Maine Food Consumers' Right to Know About Genetically Engineered Food § 2(1), 2014 Me. Laws ch. 436.
186. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
187. Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014).
188. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 39).
189. Rodríguez, supra note 115 (emphasizing the importance of finality and national integration). infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
190. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
191. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005).
192. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
193. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Examination of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835-36 & tbls.2-3 (2006).
194. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 346-51 (1990).
195. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883-84 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
196. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201.
197. A relatively recent case, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009), hinted that deference would not be granted. However, in City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75, the Court gave Chevron deference to a question concerning the agency's own jurisdiction, a question that sometimes overlaps with the preemption question.
198. Even though a state has rights to bring suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, those rights attach only to challenges to formal action, not to what are often more important interactions that occur before the agency takes formal action.
199. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
200. Id. at 236-37.
201. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(f), 124 Stat. 119, 179 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
202. id. pt. 3, 124 Stat. at 186.
203. id. § 1321, 124 Stat at 186 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041).
204. id. pt. 4, 124 Stat. at 199.
205. id. § 1331, 124 Stat. at 199 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18051).
206. id. § 1412(e), 124 Stat. at 223 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18082(e)).
207. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 337 (2013) (stating Congress thus "include[d] federalism-based experimentation as an additional purpose").
208. Ryan, supra note 13, at 33-34.
209. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1999).
210. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 1011 (reporting that half of congressional drafters surveyed said they at least sometimes intend for state implementers to implement federal statutory ambiguities).
211. Gluck, supra note 3, at 610-12 (cataloguing cases).
212. Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1996).
213. Weiser, supra note 128, at 12-13.
214. Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989)) (brackets omitted).
215. Bell Atl.-Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 227 (D. Del. 2000).
216. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883-84 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
217. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 1006-10 (reporting that only one percent of congressional drafters surveyed said that multiple delegations signal that no deference is intended, twenty-five percent said both delegates are intended to receive deference, and almost half of respondents said the answer varies between deference to single or multiple implementers depending on how the statute is structured).
218. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (discussing only multiple federal agencies).
219. Gersen, supra note 121 (same).
220. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 582 (2012) (noting the FDA's failure to consult with state officials even though so directed by the "Federalism" Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999)).
221. Young, supra note 5, at 1365.
222. 133 S. Ct. at 1873.
223. id. at 1866.
224. supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
225. Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 444, 455 (forthcoming Apr. 2014) (manuscript on file with author) (arguing that HHS's decision to delegate to the states the definition of "essential health benefits" in the health reform statute is likely not what Congress intended). For a different twist on these issues, see U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding the FCC could not sub-delegate its authority to state implementers).
226. Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187 (2001).
227. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197 (2004) (analyzing the same conflict but in the constitutional context of the spending power).
228. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015-16 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551).
229. Sharkey, supra note 138, at 581 (describing this as a "Skidmore standard").
230. Bagley & Levy, supra note 141, at 450.
231. Sarah Dash et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Decisions about Health Insurance Exchange Establishment, CENTER ON HEALTH INS.
232. REFORMS: GEO. U. HEALTH POL'Y INST. 7 (Apr. 2013), http://chir.georgetown.edu/pdfs/CMWF%20ISSUE%20BRIEF_State%20Exchange%20Implementation_Georgetown %20FINAL.pdf.
233. Bagley & Levy, supra note 141, at 455.
234. Samuel Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013).
235. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 127, at 337.
236. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10.
237. Gluck, supra note 3, at 562.
238. Theodore Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra, at 359.
239. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011).
240. Ryan, supra note 13.
241. 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
242. Legislative Digest: H.R. 2018, GOP.GOV, http://www.gop.gov/bill/112/1/hr2018 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
243. Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2011, H.R. 2018, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, July 13, 2011).
244. Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2013, H.R. 1948, 113th Cong. (as introduced in House).
245. Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2011, S. 3558, 112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate).
246. Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that federal agencies could not so constrain this type of state "autonomy" to implement federal law), superseded by statute, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612, 111 Stat. 37, 60-72 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012)).
247. Engstrom, supra note 142, at 1216 (discussing cases).
248. Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 153-54 (2012).
249. Intriguingly, the Court does apply those contract interpretation principles to a different kind of agreement between sovereigns-interstate compacts. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2013).
250. Bagenstos, supra note 60, at 391.
251. Id. at 386.
252. Katie Keith & Kevin W. Lucia, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: The State of the States, COMMONWEALTH FUND 14 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2014/Jan/1727_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_of_states.pdf.
253. Sarah Dash, Kevin Lucia & Christine Monahan, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Decisions about Health Insurance Exchange Establishment, CENTER ON HEALTH INS. REFORM 6-17 (2013), http://chir.georgetown.edu/pdfs/CMWF%20ISSUE%20BRIEF_State%20Exchange%20Implementation_Georgetown%20FINAL.pdf.
254. Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1787-88 (2007). Compare Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1978), with Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Phila. Water Dep't, 843 F.2d 679, 680 (3d Cir. 1988).
255. Richard H. Fallon,et al., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 772 (6th ed. 2009).
256. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992).
257. Compare Budget Prepay, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 605 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2010), with Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc. 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001), vacated sub nom. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (reaching opposite results).
258. Weiser, supra note 128, at 1751 n.317 (cataloging the court split on this question under the Telecommunications Act).
259. Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1984).
260. Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1179-80 (2011).
261. 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
262. Id. at 313-14.
263. Resnik, supra note 41, at 1946-47.
264. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
265. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900). For the Court's most recent invocation of it, see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
266. Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1984). accord Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr. v. Wing, 150 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 1998).
267. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 58.
268. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006).
269. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
270. Jonathan Oberlander & Krista Perreira, Implementing Obamacare in a Red State- Dispatch from North Carolina, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2469 (2013) (detailing efforts to derail implementation).
271. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 58, at 566-74 (setting out factors favoring federal jurisdiction, including "biased state court administration," and "the promotion of harmony and uniformity in the development of the law of the various states").
272. FALLON, supra note 157, at supp. 96 (questioning the wisdom of the Court's decision in Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), to deny federal question jurisdiction over the malpractice claims related to a patent claim given that most patent lawyers practice exclusively in federal courts and before the federal Patent and Trademark Office, and instead leaving claims to be "enforced by state courts that generally lack jurisdiction to consider issues of patent law").
273. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15, at 1924-60.
274. Bendor & Farmer, supra note 99, at 1295-306 (not discussing these questions as Erie questions but, rather, assuming the question to be a matter of federal law and using the framework in United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979), to determine when federal courts should take state law as the rule of decision).
275. A third of states have a "no deference" rule. another third adopt a Chevron analogue for state agency interpretations of state law and the remaining third employ something in between.
276. Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give to State Agency Interpretation?, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2008).
277. Weiser, supra note 128, at 12-13.
278. Gluck, supra note 3, at 609-15 (detailing disagreement in the lower courts).
279. 503 U.S. 607, 626 (1992) (rejecting federal-question jurisdiction for "state statutes approved by a federal agency but nevertheless applicable ex proprio vigore").
280. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011).
281. supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
282. Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federal Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1354-63 (2005).
283. Comm'r of Labor & Indus. v. Lawrence Hous. Auth., 261 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1970).
284. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995) (holding that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not give the state governor authority to form compacts with Indian tribes because state law prohibited it).
285. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (1999) (discussing Clark and other cases).
286. Rossi, supra note 180 (discussing this problem in the environmental context).
287. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236-37 (2001).
288. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012).
289. Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)' Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV (James Fleming ed., forthcoming 2014).
290. Rodríguez, supra note 115 (also emphasizing the diversity of federalism's forms).
291. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636 (1992).
292. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3.
293. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 559-60.
294. Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of "Process Federalism," 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 192-93 (1994) (discussing clear statement rules).
295. Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 563 (2012) (detailing the position that federalism canons are "justified as doctrinal reinforcement for 'process federalism' safeguards-that is, states' opportunities to protect their interests in the national lawmaking process").
296. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16, at 945-46.
297. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256-27 (2013).
298. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008).
299. Gluck, supra note 18, at 763-64.
300. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 68), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358074.
301. Abbe R. Gluck, Interpretive Tailoring (Feb. 2011) (Columbia Law Sch., Discussion Draft) (on file with author).
302. Gluck, supra note 189 (introducing this point).
303. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 189, at 70-71 (elaborating on same).
304. For elaboration, see generally Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15.
305. Gluck, supra note 18 (arguing that most of the canons should be understood as federal common law).
306. Monaghan, supra note 17.
307. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
308. Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (2013).
309. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 277 (2000).
310. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2052 (2008).