Statutory interpretation from the inside-an empirical study of congressional drafting, delegation, and the canons: Part II

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 725-802

  Bressman, Lisa Schultz ^a   Gluck, Abbe R ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84899832294     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (368)

1. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
2. 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
3. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
4. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
5. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referencing "background canons of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware").
6. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 n.22 (1983) (stating congressional drafters were "generally aware that the statute would be construed by common-law courts in accordance with traditional canons").
7. One important study preceded ours. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter offered a qualitative case study of drafting by eighteen staffers working with the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did not explore individual doctrines or other broader topics that we examined. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
8. For important early work challenging the link between canons and drafting, see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 803-16 (1983).
9. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 1, 2, 109 (2009).
10. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 5 (1993).
11. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150, 150 (1995).
12. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 586-96 (1992).
13. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 1, 9-12 (1992).
14. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 947-50 (2003).
15. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 947-50 (2003).
16. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2001) (calling it a "shared constitutional premise").
17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 319, 320 (1989) (discussing the emergence of this view in the 1980s).
18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 320-21, (1989) (discussing the emergence of this view in the 1980s).
19. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1078 (2011) (making the related observation in the agency context that the "rules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their wake the distinctive culture of lawyers" as opposed to conducing a culture of, e.g., scientists).
20. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 244 (1992).
21. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171, 171 (2000).
22. see Robert G. Kaiser, Act of Congress 28 (2013) (reporting a remark by Senator Edward Kennedy that "[n]inety-five percent of the nitty-gritty work of drafting [bills] and negotiating [their final form] is now done by staff" (second and third alterations in original).
23. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
24. See 2 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (establishing the House Office of the Legislative Counsel).
25. See 2 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (establishing the House Office of the Legislative Counsel).
26. Office of the Legislative Counsel, History and Charter, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/legcoun/HOLC/About_Our_Office/History_and_Charter.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
27. For a few exceptions, see Harry W. Jones, Bill-Drafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 445 (1952).
28. Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative Process as a Signal, 9 J. Pub. Pol'y 287, 287-306 (1989).
29. Frederic P. Lee, The Office of the Legislative Counsel, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 381 (1929).
30. One important study preceded ours. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter offered a qualitative case study of drafting by eighteen staffers working with the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did not explore individual doctrines or other broader topics that we examined. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
31. One important study preceded ours. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter offered a qualitative case study of drafting by eighteen staffers working with the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did not explore individual doctrines or other broader topics that we examined. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
32. The only reference to Legislative Counsel in the first version of the survey was in the first substantive question (Q11) about groups that participate in drafting.
33. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
34. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Gun Bill Vote: Senate Overcomes GOP Filibuster Effort to Begin Debate, Huffington Post (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:35 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/gun-bill-vote_n_3061275.html?utm_hp_ref=tw (quoting Senator Mike Lee's (R-UT) complaint that a gun bill was being debated even as "not a single senator ha[d] been provided the legislative language").
35. The Senators' Bargain (The Epidavros Project 2010) (documenting 2007 immigration reform negotiations).
36. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
37. Confidential Telephone Interview with staffer (Nov. 6, 2013).
38. See 2 U.S.C. § 272 (2012) (providing that the Senate Chief Legislative Counsel is appointed by the President Pro Tempore).
39. See 2 U.S.C. § 272 (2012) (providing that the Senate Chief Legislative Counsel is appointed by the President Pro Tempore).
40. Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003-A Year of Discovery: Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2004).
41. see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 1090 (2001) ("We are all textualists. ").
42. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 43 (2006) ("[W]e are all textualists in an important sense. ").
43. E-mail from confidential respondent to author (Oct. 14, 2013) (on file with authors).
44. See John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, 5 Green Bag 2d 283, 290 (2002).
45. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420, 424 (2005).
46. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 92 (2006).
47. See Q78.
48. Confidential Telephone Interview with staffer (Nov. 6, 2013).
49. See BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 Yale L.J. 185 (2010).
50. See Q18 (federalism or preemption).
51. The exceptions were the whole act rule (by name), Q45f (95% confidence), the whole code rule (by concept), Q44c (99% confidence.
52. 95% using super population assumption), the rule against superfluities (by name), Q45c (99% confidence).
53. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
54. See, e.g., Q65 (finding that Legislative Counsels are more likely to say courts apply consistent interpretive rules) (95% confidence).
55. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011).
56. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
58. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 65-70 (2006) (demonstrating that OIRA's role as an interagency referee may be overstated).
59. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
60. See E-mail from James Fransen, Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, to author (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with authors).
61. E-mail from Megan Renfrew, Assistant Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, to author (Apr. 11, 2012) (on file with authors).
62. See Q81.
63. See 2 U.S.C. § 281a (2012) (requiring impartiality of House Legislative Counsel).
64. Policies Governing the Performance of Duties, Off. of the Legis. Couns., U.S. Senate, http://www.slc.senate.gov/Policies/policies.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (requiring same of Senate Legislative Counsel).
65. see also Matthew Eric Glassman, Cong. Research Serv., RS20856, Office of Legislative Counsel: Senate 1 (2013) (same).
66. See Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting: American and British Practices Compared, 44 A.B.A. J. 865, 865, 907 (1958).
67. For a general comparison of American and British drafting practices, see James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2007).
68. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
69. Universal Comment Code 4.
70. A search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the words "committee" and "jurisdiction" in the same paragraph uncovered five cases in which committee jurisdiction was referenced in regard to a statutory interpretation issue, but only three of those cases really utilized the concept. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 533 (1998) (noting that a proposal might have been rejected not because Congress disagreed with it but because the proposal involved a "wide-ranging subject matter [that] was beyond the... Committee's jurisdiction").
71. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978) (citing the fact that the Appropriations Committee had no jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species as one reason to disregard statements about the Endangered Species Act in its committee report).
72. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 n.1 (1981) (considering relevance of the fact that two different committees drafted two different sections of a drug statute to whether Congress intended that violations of both sections result in multiple sentences). The other two cases merely discussed the committee's position on an issue.
73. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991) (concluding that the committees with jurisdiction over the bill disagreed on its meaning).
74. Johnson v. Mayor of Balt., 472 U. S 353, 367 (1985) (concluding that certain civil service provisions were unchanged in ADEA amendments to allow committees with jurisdiction more opportunity to review such provisions).
75. See generally Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (1973) (reporting results of the most in-depth study of the committee system in history).
76. Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1655, 1710-11 (2006).
77. See Committees, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/ committees (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (listing standing, select, and joint committees).
78. Committees, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_ with_teasers/committees_home.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (listing standing, special, select, and joint committees).
79. see also Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 637, 649 (2012) (counting more than 200 committees if one includes all subcommittees).
80. See Q44a-d (comment code).
81. See Q44a-d (comment codes).
82. Q60 ("[C]onceptual marks are what we vote on, not really on language, and someone works on the language after that. ").
83. cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 191, 192 (1992) (highlighting dangers of making substantive law through the appropriations process).
84. Cf. Robert A. Katzmann, The Continuing Challenge, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 180, 183-84 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (discussing checklists).
85. see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-261SP, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 2-113, 3-40 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ assets/210/202437.pdf.
86. Staff of S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th Cong., Guide for Preparation of Committee Reports 2-3 (Comm. Print 2009).
87. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, Checklist for Legislative Drafting 2 (on file with authors).
88. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, 105th Cong., Legislative Drafting Manual 6 (1997) [hereinafter Senate Drafting Manual].
89. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Cong., House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style 3 (1995) [hereinafter House Drafting Manual].
90. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Cong., House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style 61-62 (1995) [hereinafter House Drafting Manual].
91. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, 105th Cong., Legislative Drafting Manual 76 (1997) [hereinafter Senate Drafting Manual].
92. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Cong., House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style 3 (1995) [hereinafter House Drafting Manual].
93. Lawrence E. Filson & Sandra L. Strokoff, The Legislative Drafter's Desk Reference 367-82 (2d ed. 2008).
94. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2189 (2012).
95. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 643 (2005).
96. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
97. Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 90 (1992).
98. For some examples in the lower courts, see Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1064 (10th Cir. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 2181.
99. Star-Glo Assocs., LP v. United States, 414 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
100. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-45 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
101. United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2180 (2010).
102. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60-61 (2004).
103. Purcell v. Bank of Am., 659 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2011).
104. Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1322 (11th Cir. 2011).
105. See Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress 65-66, 138 n.93 (1997).
106. cf. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 574-78 (1992) (recommending other ways for Congress to communicate with courts).
107. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
108. See John F. Manley, Congressional Staff and Public Policy-Making: The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30 J. Pol. 1046, 1050-52 (1968).
109. Overview, Joint Committee on Tax'n, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
110. E-mail from confidential respondent to author (July 2, 2012) (on file with authors). The Senate Finance Committee used to have similar staff.
111. David E. Price, Professionals and "Entrepreneurs": Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. Pol. 316, 327 (1971).
112. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
113. See Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization 254-57 (1991).
114. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 311 (1997).
115. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
116. see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090, 1097-120 (2008) (identifying this "continuum" of deference).
117. Cf. Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 23, 28 (2011) (reporting a connection between oversight and agency responsiveness).
118. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
119. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
120. see Robert G. Kaiser, Act of Congress 28 (2013) (reporting a remark by Senator Edward Kennedy that "[n]inety-five percent of the nitty-gritty work of drafting [bills] and negotiating [their final form] is now done by staff" (second and third alterations in original).
121. Q30. Judiciary respondents were more likely than others to know the rule of lenity (99% confidence).
122. See R. Eric Petersen et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41366, House of Representatives and Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2010, at 19, 24 (2010).
123. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
124. Universal Comment Code 9 (selected).
125. Universal Comment Code 15 (all).
126. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
127. see also Unanimous Consent, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/unanimous_consent.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
128. Q49 (reporting, for example, that "on the personal office side they often have only a vague idea of what they want and Leg. Counsel has to do a lot more").
129. Q49 (reporting, for example, that "on the personal office side they often have only a vague idea of what they want and Leg. Counsel has to do a lot more").
130. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (4th ed. 2012).
131. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (4th ed. 2012).
132. Universal Comment Code 20.
133. cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in Can the Government Govern? 238, 238-39 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (arguing that party leadership gained power in the 1980s at the expense of committee power).
134. see Q61.
135. See Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Dec. 2002, art. 1, at 1, 7, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue-2/ils.2002.2.2.1020/ils.2002.2.2.1020.xml ?format=INT (subscription required).
136. Universal Comment Code 16.
137. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
138. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (4th ed. 2012).
139. Apart from the occasional acknowledgement of a statute's omnibus nature, see, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 498 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting it was "not surprising" that a 750-page omnibus bill had a scrivener's error), the Court appears not to have distinguished between these and other types of statutes.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (construing part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1984 and noting "I think there would have been some mention of this important change in the legislative history").
141. See Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Dec. 2002, art. 1, at 1, 7, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue-2/ils.2002.2.2.1020/ils.2002.2.2.1020.xml?format=INT (subscription required).
142. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70 (2012).
143. See Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Dec. 2002, art. 1, at 1, 7, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue-2/ils.2002.2.2.1020/ils.2002.2.2.1020.xml ?format=INT (subscription required).
144. Q71. Seven of the remaining thirty-five respondents who did not answer the initial question in this manner offered comments to the same effect.
145. Q71. Seven of the remaining thirty-five respondents who did not answer the initial question in this manner offered comments to the same effect.
146. see Q44b.
147. see Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 112-161, R. XXI(2)(a)(2), at 850-53 (Thomas J. Wickham ed., 2013).
148. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 112-1, R. XVI, at 14-16 (2011).
149. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70 (2012).
150. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (4th ed. 2012).
151. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
152. One important study preceded ours. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter offered a qualitative case study of drafting by eighteen staffers working with the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did not explore individual doctrines or other broader topics that we examined. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
153. See Memorandum from Alexandra Golden, Columbia Law Sch., to Abbe R. Gluck 7-8 (Feb. 1, 2012) (on file with authors).
154. See Memorandum from Alexandra Golden, Columbia Law Sch., to Abbe R. Gluck 8 (Feb. 1, 2012) (on file with authors).
155. see Don Wolfensberger, Have House-Senate Conferences Gone the Way of the Dodo?, Roll Call (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53_127/-23250-1.html.
156. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
157. The CBO was created in 1974, as part of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. 297, 302-05 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (2012).
158. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Democrats See Hope on Health Bill, N.Y. Times (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/health/policy/ 10healthbill.html.
159. see Robert Keith, Cong. Research Serv., R41005, The Statutory PAYGO Process for Budget Enforcement: 1991-2002 (2009).
160. see also Philip G. Joyce, The Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Power and Policymaking 224 (2011).
161. The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: A Description, White House: Office Mgmt. & Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/paygo_description (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
162. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1031 (2011) (describing "Congress-driven by political pressures-directing the scoring practices of the CBO in an aggressive manner").
163. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 206, (2011) (making the related observation in the agency context that the "rules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their wake the distinctive culture of lawyers" as opposed to conducing a culture of, e.g., scientists).
164. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 411, 427.
165. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 91-99 (1985).
166. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 134-41 (2000).
167. cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 575-89 (2009) (arguing against automatic deference).
168. see Q25.
169. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 505-24 (2005).
170. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329-35 (1990).
171. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 508, (2005).
172. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329-35 (1990).
173. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 432-45 (1989).
174. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 513, (2005).
175. see also James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 1000, 1011 (2007).
176. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329-35 (1990).
177. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 519, (2005).
178. accord Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 Va. L. Rev. 2009, 2038 (2010).
179. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329-35 (1990).
180. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes 24 (2010).
181. Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common Law Interpretation 141-74 (2013).
182. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 197, 198-204 (2007).
183. Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Dec. 2002, art. 2, at 1, http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue-2/ils.2002.2.2.1021/ils.2002.2.2.1021.xml ?format=INT (subscription required).
184. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 797-98 (2010).
185. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 468 (1987).
186. Universal Comment Code 8.
187. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 995-96 (1992) (disputing existence of evidence of congressional intent to defer to agency interpretations without explicit grants of such authority).
188. For a summary of such arguments, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1985).
189. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 685 (5th ed. 2003) ("As specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand attenuates, interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking. ").
190. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 160-61 (2010) (arguing the substantive canons, unlike the textual canons, are judicial policy creations).
191. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are "Common Law Statutes" Different?, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 89, 89-91 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that the Court's own dividing lines for such statutes are unclear).
192. See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 213 (1934) (describing the "emphasis placed upon the judge as a creative artist in the making of law" as a defining feature of the time).
193. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 579, 582-83 (1992) (distinguishing between statutes directed at agencies and at the public).
194. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
195. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
196. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
197. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Essay, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight, " 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1162-63 (2012) (speculating that reasonableness review might consider whether an agency interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose).
198. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 111-12 (2008).
199. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272, 1310-11 (2002).
200. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1144 (1990).
201. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329-35 (1990).
202. see also Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 997 (2007) (arguing that courts should consult agencies when provisionally resolving statutory ambiguities).
203. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1901, 1924-60 (2011).
204. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1901, 1924-60 (2011).
205. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 505-24 (2005).
206. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (4th ed. 2012).
207. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, (2005).
208. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 342 (1990).
209. In total, forty-eight unique respondents (35%) offered comments of this nature.
210. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 469 (1996).
211. accord Q68.
212. Universal Comment Code 10.
213. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950).
214. One important study preceded ours. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter offered a qualitative case study of drafting by eighteen staffers working with the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did not explore individual doctrines or other broader topics that we examined. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
215. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are "Common Law Statutes" Different?, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 89, 89-91 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that the Court's own dividing lines for such statutes are unclear).
216. Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 96 (2010).
217. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 198 (2008).
218. See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
219. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
220. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 116-18, 162-64.
221. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 247, 252 (1999).
222. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
223. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
224. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
225. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
226. cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 753, 755-56 (2013) (arguing judges already are engaging in federal common lawmaking by devising and applying the canons).
227. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
228. Abbe R. Gluck, Interpretive Tailoring 1 (Nov. 15, 2011) (discussion draft) (on file with authors).
229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1500 (1987).
230. Jerry L. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 Yale L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. ").
231. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 527-28 (2009).
232. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 244-45 (2012).
233. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1756 (2010).
234. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2156 (2002).
235. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 803, (2010).
236. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 112-1, R. XVI, at 14-16 (2011).
237. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 83 (5th ed. 2001).
238. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
239. David C. King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction (1997).
240. See Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization 254-57 (1991).
241. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: Methods Appendix, Stan. L. Rev. (May 2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Gluck_Bressman_65_Stan._L._Rev._ Methods_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Methods Appendix].
242. 499 U.S. 83, 88-99 (1991).
243. see William D. Popkin, The Judicial Role: Statutory Interpretation and the Pragmatic Judicial Partner 102-03 (2013) (raising the same concerns about consistent usage presumptions).
244. Memorandum from Noah Kazis, Yale Law Sch., to Abbe R. Gluck (Sept. 17, 2013) (on file with authors).
245. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
246. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
247. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
248. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
249. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70 (2012).
250. 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978).
251. See Abbe R. Gluck, The "CBO Canon" and the Debate over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html.
252. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1026 n.6 (2009).
253. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 494-95 (2010).
254. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 Drake L. Rev. 807, 808 (1993).
255. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
256. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
257. We also recognize that our focus on committee counsels is a limitation. We cannot know whether personal staff would leave us with the same impressions, but all of the elected members for whom personal staff work do sit on committees.
258. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 16.
259. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1078 (2011).
260. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-17.
261. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (No. 05-18), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-18.pdf (evincing confusion among Justices about whether conference reports are agreed upon by both houses or voted upon).
262. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70 (2012).
263. For examples from October Term 2012, see Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757-61 (2013) ("defalcation").
264. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1170-73 (2013) ("provides otherwise").
265. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2013) ("vessel").
266. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 Marq L. Rev. 77, 102-03 (2010) (illustrating the Court's preference for dictionary definitions of isolated terms over broader contextual analysis).
267. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras 9 (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2195644, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195644 (same).
268. Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 96 (2010).
269. See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
270. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
271. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
272. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
273. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 227 (1990).
274. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 198 (2008).
275. Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 235 (2013).
276. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
277. Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 96 (2010).
278. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
279. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 247 (1990).
280. This question was added to the survey after the first few days of interviews.
281. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 353 (1990) (calling this approach the "funnel of abstraction").
282. See Todd D. Rakoff, Essay, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1559, 1560 (2010).
283. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
284. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 244-45 (2012).
285. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
286. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111.
287. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
288. Federal courts give "super" stare decisis to their substantive interpretations of statutes but do not give precedential weight to the interpretive decisions used to construe them-for example, which legislative history is reliable or which canon trumps which-even where the same statute is being construed. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863, 1866-67 (2008).
289. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
290. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
291. For a general comparison of American and British drafting practices, see James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2007).
292. For a general comparison of American and British drafting practices, see James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2007).
293. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 579, 582-83 (1992) (distinguishing between statutes directed at agencies and at the public).
294. See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473 (2007).
295. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 1, 2, 109 (2009).
296. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
297. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 947-50 (2003).
298. See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 209, (2009).
299. Compare, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (giving Chevron deference to agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction).
300. Peter Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 82 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (favoring Skidmore model of taking agency view into account but leaving ultimate power with courts).
301. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
302. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 179 (1990).
303. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Only Has One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597 (2009).
304. See, e.g., Hard Cider, Semi-Generic Wine Designations and Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Signs, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,938, 58,940 (Nov. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 4, 19, 24, 194, 250, 251) ("Although the law specified 'no other fruit product,' ATF interpreted this to mean no artificial fruit flavors, either. Our basis for making that decision was the legislative history of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,... contained in... the 'Blue Book'.... ").
305. Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,220, 67,223 (proposed Nov. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("[The Blue Book] indicates Congressional intent that this treatment [as qualifying property] is not limited to food and beverages.... ").
306. See, e.g., Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The government urges, however, that we look for insight into the intent of Congress in the General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1998, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, November 24, 1998 (the 'Blue Book').... As a post-enactment explanation, the Blue Book interpretation is entitled to little weight. ").
307. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 353 (1990) (calling this approach the "funnel of abstraction").
308. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 209 (2013).
309. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
310. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
311. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 89-93 (1990) (proposing office within the judiciary).
312. See Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress 69-81 (1997).
313. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1417, 1432 (1987). A notable exception is Judge Robert Katzmann, who has suggested a variety of mechanisms, including staff training, default interpretive positions, more widespread use of Legislative Counsel, and ways to encourage more frequent and open communications, in addition to ex post mechanisms.
314. See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 637, 682-94 (2012).
315. Amendments, House Committee on Rules, http://rules.house.gov/amendments (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
316. Universal Comment Code 8. Twenty-four percent of respondents volunteered cross-references, without prompting, as obstacles to understanding statutory text.
317. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
318. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.140 (West 2013).
319. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 303 (2013) (requiring a description of the cross-referenced section).
320. see also, e.g., Fawbush v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ky. 1951) (holding that crossreferences cannot be used for statutory construction).
321. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1489-92 (2000).
322. Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 135, 139 (2011).
323. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. IV, § 26 (requiring bills to be "printed or reproduced and in the possession of each house for at least five days").
324. Okla. Const. art. V, § 34 ("Every bill shall be read on three different days in each House, and no bill shall become a law unless, on its final passage, it be read at length.... ").
325. see also Read the Bills Act, S. 3360, 112th Cong. (2012).
326. H.R. 554, 111th Cong. (2009).
327. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
328. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983).
329. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 207.
330. Compare, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2637, 2660-70 (2003).
331. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1772-73 (2007).
332. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012).
333. 21 U.S.C. § 854(d).
334. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947, reprinted as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note.
335. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2110 (2002).
336. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
337. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 199 (1976).
338. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
339. For suggestions that courts could use statutory interpretation rules to perform such a role, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the Regulatory State 44-59 (1992).
340. Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227 (1986).
341. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013).
342. See generally Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is to Be Master, " the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 837 (2009) (cataloguing the debate on both sides).
343. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2156 (2002).
344. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 244-45 (2012).
345. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 527-28 (2009).
346. See Abbe R. Gluck, The "CBO Canon" and the Debate over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html.
347. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 244-45 (2012).
348. See Abbe R. Gluck, The "CBO Canon" and the Debate over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html.
349. For a full list, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy app. B at 31-38 (4th ed. 2007).
350. For a full list, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy app. B at 31-38 (4th ed. 2007).
351. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 500 (2011).
352. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675-76 (2012) (joint dissent).
353. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131-33 (2000).
354. But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (declining to recognize a special rule for deference on questions of the agency's jurisdiction).
355. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
356. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
357. Thanks to Anne Joseph O'Connell for this insight.
358. Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
359. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 204.
360. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 206, (2011) (making the related observation in the agency context that the "rules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their wake the distinctive culture of lawyers" as opposed to conducing a culture of, e.g., scientists).
361. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1445-47 (2005).
362. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
363. The Court's most recent administrative law decision, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), might be viewed as a shift back toward simplicity, as the Court refused to carve out another special exception to Chevron deference for jurisdictional questions.
364. See generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
365. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1033-58 (1998).
366. We recognize that subject-specific interpretive regimes could pose problems for areas where oversight is split among multiple committees.
367. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 212, (2010).
368. See generally Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (1973), xiv, (reporting results of the most in-depth study of the committee system in history).