Dormancy

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 497-570

  Pursley, Garrick B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO   (United States)

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EID: 84860211378     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (356)

1. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument "that a sufficiently strong state interest could make lawful an otherwise impermissible intrusion into the federal government's foreign affairs power"), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
2. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000);
3. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the Dormant Commerce Clause an "unjustified judicial invention");
4. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 532 n.128 (2008) (noting the "atextual[ity]" critique of Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2009 & n.21 (2009) (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause is "atextual" and citing opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas mounting similar criticisms).
5. Justice Souter's veiled reference in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York is a good example. See 511 U.S. 383, 424-25 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]the bar to monopolies . . . arises from a statutory, not a constitutional, mandate. No more than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause 'does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics . . . [or] embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)))
6. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617.
7. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (applying Dormant Commerce Clause);
8. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (applying dormant executive-foreign-affairs-power doctrine);
9. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (applying Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine);
10. Zschernig Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (establishing dormant foreign-affairs-power doctrine, still on the books);
11. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (establishing dormant admiralty doctrine, still good law)
12. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
13. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (observing that the Constitution contains "several clauses with important federalism implications, but no central 'Federalism Clause'"). The legitimacy of extracanonical constitutional norms has been defended ably elsewhere.
14. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);
15. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980);
16. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010);
17. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006);
18. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004);
19. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008);
20. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (2009);
21. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Constitution].
22. Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220, 220-21 (2006), http://hlr.rubystudio.com/media/pdf/berman. pdf
23. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37-44 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court's role is one of implementation and that the Court applies and, sometimes, creates doctrine to implement constitutional meaning).
24. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1741 (2005).
25. Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1520-21 (2004).
26. Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2005) ("[D]ecision rules are unavoidable-and not just because general propositions do not decide concrete cases. A court must give structure to the adjudicatory process; it must determine and assign burdens of proof, production, and persuasion.").
27. Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436-43 (1997) (assessing the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action programs);
28. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1495-99 (2004) (canvassing interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause).
29. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91, 307-15 (1978)
30. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90). See generally Siegel, supra note 26, at 1495-99 (explaining why the court adopted strict scrutiny for analyzing racial classifications in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). For defenses of this interpretation
31. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 597-605 (1963);
32. Herbert Wechsler, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School (Apr. 7, 1959), in 73 HARV. LREV. 1 (1959).
33. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429-30 (1960);
34. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1959).
35. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (analyzing the idea of judicially manageable standards as an output of constitutional adjudication).
36. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993);
37. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001);
38. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993).
39. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose."). The best rationale for strict scrutiny, and its status as a decision rule, is debatable.
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
41. The phrase "strict scrutiny" first appears in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
42. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
43. A canonical formulation is in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
44. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
45. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 962-63, 976 (1985).
46. Envision a system like the Michigan law-school-admissions policy at issue in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312-16 (2003), although that was a university policy rather than a government program.
47. This is one of the arguments advanced in support of the University of California affirmative action program at issue in Bakke and the Richmond minority-contractor-preference program at issue in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989).
48. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001);
49. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
50. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99;
51. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion).
52. Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 64, 65 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998);
53. Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, 153-54
54. Michael J. Perry, What Is "the Constitution"? (and Other Fundamental Questions), in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, , 103.
55. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983);
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
57. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-84 (1989);
58. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935), the finality doctrine precludes congressional exercise of judicial power
59. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 223-26 (1995)
60. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-96 (1988);
61. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986).
62. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (noting that the structure of government "is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
63. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (observing that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered").
64. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.").
65. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 20, 165, 167 (2006).
66. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (discussing Reconstruction and the New Deal Era as periods of transformative constitutional change);
67. NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (arguing that constitutional law is and should be shaped by both judicial forces and the larger political culture of elected officials and citizens);
68. KEITH E.WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (discussing the effect of politics on constitutional meaning);
69. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (arguing that a confluence of events, including a controversial presidential election and several conservative judicial decisions, has led to "constitutional revolution");
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 934-37 (2007) (canvassing this literature).
72. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
73. Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 975-76 (2004);
74. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2001).
75. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
76. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 508-10 (2008) (noting the Constitution's "spare" discussion of affirmative state-government power).
77. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 104-06 (2004).
78. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999) (holding that Congress, with narrow exceptions, is precluded from authorizing suits for damages against state governments in state court);
79. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-28 (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state governments);
80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond the Commerce Clause power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (stating that the Constitution does not authorize Congress "to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (holding that a clear statement of congressional intent is required to "alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government'" (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989))).
81. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (holding that the Constitution places the states on "equal footing" and makes them "equal in power, dignity, and authority");
82. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
83. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962-63 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[W]here one branch has impaired or sought to assume a power central to another branch, the Court has not hesitated to enforce the [preclusive separation of powers] doctrine.");
84. ("The [Framers] . . . viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.");
85. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
86. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (discussing a separation of powers challenge to legislative courts);
87. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (same).
88. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (involving a separation of powers challenge to congressional control of executive officials).
89. Compare, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the separation of powers preclusion is violated in principle "where one branch has impaired or sought to assume a power central to another branch" (emphasis added)), with id. at 963 ("Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." (emphases added) (citations omitted)).
90. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265-71 (2009) (arguing that even where state autonomy is constricted by preemption and federal takeover of regulatory subject areas, states retain a muscular form of voice with which they wield "the power of the servant" in the increasingly integrated system of joint, interactive federal-state regulation);
91. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 682-83 (1999) (discussing this interpretive canon).
92. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
94. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819);
95. see also Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 567-68 (2001)
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
97. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406.
98. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 28-53 (2005);
99. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2-12 (1913);
100. See generally Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 471-75 (1941)
101. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 486 (2008)
102. Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 392 (1999)
103. Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 81-85 (2005);
104. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985)
105. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
106. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001)
107. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994) (Pubitemid 24822086)
108. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478, 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
109. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 121-24 (2001)
110. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 743-46 & n.67 (2010)
111. Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 427 (2008)
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1;
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
114. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 81 (1983)
115. quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 954 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833)
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
118. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 761 (2010);
119. cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1976)
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1;
121. Benjamin Franklin, Papers Relating to a Plan of Union of the Colonies, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 197, 208-11, 217 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1905)
122. On the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
123. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1493-98 (2007).
124. On state coinage, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1;
125. On the congressional arrest preclusion, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1;
126. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (Supp. 2011).
127. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)
128. superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3360-74
129. codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)
130. as recognized in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974-75 (2011).
131. John Schwartz & Randal C. Archibold, A Law Facing a Tough Road Through the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/ 28/us/28legal.html
132. See, e.g., Martin Finucane & Stephanie Ebbert, Council Calls for a Boycott of Arizona, BOS. GLOBE, May 6, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/ massachusetts/articles/2010/05/06/council-calls-for-a-boycott-of-arizona/;
133. Katie Honan, City Council Initiates Arizona Boycott, NBC N.Y. (May 13, 2010), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/City-Council-Initiates-Arizona- Boycott- 93681064.html;
134. Garrett Therolf & Howard Blume, L.A. County Votes To Boycott Arizona over Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/ 2010/jun/02/local/la-me-0602-arizona-boycott-20100602.
135. See, e.g., 68% Oppose Boycotts of Arizona over New Immigration Law, RASMUSSEN REP. (May 20, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/ politics/current-events/immigration/68-oppose-boycotts-of-arizona-over-new- immigration-law;
136. Dave Wedge, Boston Beaned for Arizona Boycott, BOS. HERALD, May 7, 2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/politics/view.bg?articleid-1253067.
137. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24-25 & n.52 (2009)
138. Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)
139. quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)
140. abrogated by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)
141. See Bos. Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329.
142. See generally Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule" the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 160-65 (2005)
143. For accounts advocating the free-market view, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 26.3 (3d ed. 1986);
144. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35 (1982).
145. Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 63-64 (1988);
146. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995)
147. E.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
148. See Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1239-40 (2009)
149. citing W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 64-82 (2d ed. 1978);
150. Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76 (1978)).
151. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193 (2006), http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/krooseve/workingpapers/ 119HarvLRevF193(2006).pdf.
152. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968)
153. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)
154. superseded by statute, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251-65
155. codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006));
156. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851);
157. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 83, 85-87 (1824);
158. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819);
159. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
160. See, e.g., Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000)
161. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986)
162. See U.S. CONST. art. V;
163. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996);
164. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).
165. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002)
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000)
167. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Indivisible Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 326 (2008)
168. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
169. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965)
170. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 178 (1803);
171. see also William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1
172. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962)
173. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829);
174. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 447-49 (1827);
175. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824).
176. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209;
177. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203;
178. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 174 (1985).
179. See Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447-49
180. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
181. Or.Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
182. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2007)
183. quoting City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
184. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
185. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
186. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
187. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)
188. Cf. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927)
189. overruled in part by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
190. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996);
191. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 112-13 (1994)
192. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 54-75 (2008)
193. On tax subsidies, see generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382-405 (1996)
194. see generally Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 916-31 (2011)
195. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977)
196. Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 30-31 (2002).
197. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 143-44 (2001);
198. Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1251-52 (2006);
199. cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970)
200. superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 220.
201. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685-86 (1999).
202. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959);
203. S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938);
204. see also William Lee Biddle, Comment, State Regulation of the Internet: Where Does the Balance of Federalist Power Lie?, 37 CAL.W. L. REV. 161, 177 (2000)
205. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005)
206. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)
207. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1946).
208. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803)
209. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155, 156 & nn.2-3 (1999)
210. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994)
211. Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998);
212. Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125;
213. William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 122-32 (1993)
214. Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 390-99 (1999)
215. Ernest A. Young, It's Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 471 (2004)
216. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
217. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
218. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741-42 (1961)
219. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-74 (1959)
220. W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921)
221. David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 7-14 (1997)
222. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1994);
223. For example, Congress has expressly provided that state courts may hear admiralty cases since the first Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77;
224. U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006)
225. Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452 n.3
226. In re The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1874)
227. In re The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21Wall.) at 575.
228. See Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 451.
229. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
230. superseded by statute, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251
231. codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006));
232. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959);
233. see also Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 451
234. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216
235. See Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 458-62
236. Cf. Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 461-62
237. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
238. See Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996)
239. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003)
240. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1078 (1983);
241. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 343-44 (1999);
242. Jose Angelo Estrella Faria, Uniform Law for International Transport at UNCITRAL: New Times, New Players, and New Rules, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 277, 303-04 (2009).
243. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 n.3 (1994)
244. See Pan. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1924).
245. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 162-64 (1920);
246. see Ernest A. Young, Essay, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1661 (2008).
247. See In re The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
248. Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (2000);
249. Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 528 n.14 (2004);
250. 253 U.S. 149, 162-64 (1920).
251. Knickerbocker Ice, 253 U.S. at 164.
252. See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1162-1236 (2000).
253. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
254. See generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)
255. Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986)
256. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979)
257. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451;
258. see Wardair, 477 U.S. at 8;
259. Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1655 (2008).
260. See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992).
261. See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 8;
262. Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79.
263. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
264. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 323 (1994)
265. quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
266. 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
267. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-07 (Deering 2009)
268. preempted by Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396;
269. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409-10.
270. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401-08.
271. quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376, 381 (2000)
272. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 87, 123-24 (2009);
273. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Essay, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1790-91 (2009);
274. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 876-79 & n.47 (2008).
275. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419-20.
276. quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)
277. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10662 (2007);
278. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 332-33 (2009).
279. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417-20.
280. quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968)
281. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2;
282. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-32 & n.143 (2009)
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-4, 10-16.
284. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936);
285. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2-3 (1990)
286. Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 94-96 (2009)
287. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
288. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 75-76
289. see generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 992-95 (2004)
290. Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 178-88 (2001)
291. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346-47 (2006);
292. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988);
293. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981);
294. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962);
295. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-22 (1936).
296. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1404-19 (2009);
297. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100-02 (2008);
298. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
299. Cf. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107-08 (2000)
300. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
301. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)
302. superseded by statute, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251
303. codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006)
304. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999
305. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
306. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8;
307. see generally Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1104-07 (1999)
308. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1630-31 (1997)
309. quoting Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 391 (1998)
310. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
311. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
312. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 249-50 (1990)
313. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143 (2009)
314. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996);
315. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 443-45 (1994);
316. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Norfolk Dredging Co. v. Misener Marine Constr., 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010) (No. 09-1164), 2010 WL 1220964, at*10 & n.13;
317. see also Garrick B. Pursley, The Structure of Preemption Decisions, 85 NEB. L. REV. 912, 916 (2007)
318. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (2008).
319. See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1982)
320. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977)
321. see generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
322. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994)
323. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000)
324. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 212-20 (1824);
325. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000);
326. see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000);
327. cf. Mary J. Davis, The "New" Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1219 (2010)
328. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
329. cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985)
330. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1467-69 (1995)
331. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1368-73 (2001)
332. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009);
333. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008).
334. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 108.
335. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-76 & n.8 (2000);
336. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
337. Locke, 529 U.S. at 109;
338. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1982).
339. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 265-66 (2000).
340. see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1211-12, 1216-17
341. see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000)
342. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)
343. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985);
344. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996);
345. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36VA. L. REV. 1 (1950)
346. Cf. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1471 (2001)
347. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985).
348. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962)
349. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-28 (1998)
350. See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 445-46 (1994);
351. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2;
352. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)
353. superseded by statute, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251
354. codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006)
355. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
356. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)