An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 39-57

  Brunner, Christoph ^a   Goeree, Jacob K ^a   Holt, Charles A ^b   Ledyard, John O ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049440541     PISSN: 19457669     EISSN: 19457685     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.39     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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