The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment

Experimental Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 79-101

  Resnick, Paul ^a   Zeckhauser, Richard ^b   Swanson, John ^c   Lockwood, Kate ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c EBAY INC   (United States)

^d NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

eBay; Field experiment; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744807496     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2     Document Type: Article

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