How effective are electronic reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation

Management Science

Volumn 50, Issue 11, 2004, Pages 1587-1602

  Bolton, Gary E ^a,b   Katok, Elena ^a,b   Ockenfels, Axel ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Electronic markets; Reciprocity; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC MARKETS; RECIPROCITY; REPUTATION; TRUST;

FEEDBACK; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MARKETING; PROBLEM SOLVING; PUBLIC POLICY;

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY;

EID: 9944260468     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0199     Document Type: Review

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