An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 89-115

  Brandts, Jordi ^a   Figueras, Neus ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Experiments; Reputation formation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037209818     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00042-2     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Camerer, C., Weigelt, K., 1988. Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model. Econometrica 56, 1-36.
2. Figueras, N., 1992. Un test experimental d'un model d'equilibri seqüencial amb reputació, Master's Thesis. U.A.B. (original in catalan).
3. Jung, Y.J., Kagel, J.H., Levin, D., 1994. On the existence of predatory pricing: an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain-store game. RAND Journal of Economics 25, 72-93.
4. Kreps, D.M.,Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253-279.
5. Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1982. Predation, reputation and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 280-312.
6. Neral, J., Ochs, J., 1992. The sequential equilibrium theory of reputation building: a further test. Econometrica 60, 1151-1169.
7. Selten, R., 1978. The chain-store paradox. Theory and Decision 9, 127-159.