Information value and externalities in reputation building

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 23-33

  Bolton, Gary E ^a   Ockenfels, Axel ^b   Ebeling, Felix ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

C71; C91; D83

Indexed keywords

C71; C91; CHAIN STORES; D83; ECONOMIC VALUES; INFORMATION VALUE; SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 78651074129     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.04.005     Document Type: Article

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