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Volumn 100, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 2187-2204

Is reputation good or bad? An experiment

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EID: 78650505060     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2187     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (41)

References (23)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.