Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 321-344

  Xiao, Erte ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corruption; Experiment; Norms; Punishment; Sender receiver game

Indexed keywords

EID: 84869174473     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.010     Document Type: Article

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