Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 135-156

  Tyran, Jean Robert ^a   Feld, Lars P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Deterrent effect of legal sanctions; Expressive law; Public goods; Social norms; Voting

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS; SANCTION;

EID: 33646432264     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x     Document Type: Article

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