Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: Lying and threats in ultimatum games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 143-159

  Croson, Rachel ^a   Boles, Terry ^b   Murnighan, J Keith ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Experimental bargaining; Ultimatum games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037410294     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00092-6     Document Type: Article

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