An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 86-112

  Sánchez Pagés, Santiago ^a   Vorsatz, Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Morally consistent behavior; Procedural justice; Strategic information transmission; Truth telling

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548458970     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014     Document Type: Article

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