The aversion to lying

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 81-92

  Lundquist, Tobias ^a   Ellingsen, Tore ^a   Gribbe, Erik ^a   Johannesson, Magnus ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Communication; Deception; Experiments; Lies; Promises

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249142653     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010     Document Type: Article

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