Lying for strategic advantage: Rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 133-149

  Crawford, Vincent P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242433408     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455197     Document Type: Article

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