Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 146-170

  Galbiati, Roberto ^a,b   Vertova, Pietro ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INSUBRIA   (Italy)

^b BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Incentives; Laws; Obligations; Public good games

Indexed keywords

EID: 48649086809     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Bohnet, I., Cooter, B., 2005. Expressive law: Framing or equilibrium selection? Working paper, UC Berkeley
2. Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2002. Prosocial emotions. Working paper No. 02-07-028, Santa Fe Institute
3. Camerer, C.F., Fehr, E., in press. Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists. In: Heinrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., (Eds.), Foundation of Human Sociality. Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small-Scale Societies. Oxford Univ. Press
4. Cardenas J.C., Stranlund J., and Willis C. Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out. World Devel. 28 10 (2000) 1719-1733
5. Cooter R. Expressive law and economics. J. Legal Stud. 27 (1998) 585-608
6. Cooter R., and Ulen T. Law and Economics (2003), Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA
7. Falk A., Fehr E., and Zehnder C. The behavioural effects of minimum wages. Quart. J. Econ. 121 4 (2006) 1347-1381
8. Fehr E., and Falk A. Psychological foundations of incentives. Europ. Econ. Rev. 46 (2002) 687-724
9. Fehr E., and Gaechter S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Amer. Econ. Rev. 90 4 (2000) 980-994
10. Fehr E., and Schmidt K. Theories of fairness and reciprocity-Evidence and economic applications. In: Dewatripont M., Hansen L., and Turnovsky St. (Eds). Advances in Economics and Econometrics, 8th World Congress. Econometric Soc. Monogr (2001), Cambridge Univ. Press
11. Fischbacher, U., 1999. Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments-experimenter's manual. Working paper No. 21. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
12. Fischbacher U., Gaechter S., and Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Econ. Letters 71 (2001) 391-404
13. Gneezy U., and Rustichini A. A fine is a price. J. Legal Stud. 29 (2000) 1-17
14. Holt C.A., and Laury S. Risk aversion and incentives effects. Amer. Econ. Rev. 92 (2001) 1644-1655
15. Kahan D.M. Social influence, social meaning and deterrence. Virginia Law Rev. 3 (1997) 349-395
16. Kahan, D.M., 2002. The logic of reciprocity: Trust, collective action, and the law. Mimeo. Working Paper Series No. 281, Yale Law School
17. Ledyard J.O. Public goods: A survey of the experimental research. In: Kagel J.H., and Roth A. (Eds). The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton Univ. Press
18. McAdams R., and Nadler J. Testing the focal point theory of legal compliance: The effect of a third-party expression in an experimental hawk/dove game. J. Empirical Legal Stud. 2 (2005) 87-123
19. Offerman T., Sonnemans J., and Schram A. Belief learning in public good games. Econ. Inquiry 39 (2001) 250-269
20. Polinsky M., and Shavell S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. J. Econ. Lit. 38 (2000) 45-76
21. Raz J. The Concept of a Legal System (1980), Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford
22. Robinson P.H., and Darley J.M. The utility of desert. Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. 91 (1997) 453-499
23. Tyler T. Why People Obey Law (1990), Yale Univ. Press
24. Tyran J.R., and Feld L. Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent. Scand. J. Econ. 208 1 (2006) 135-156