Do CEOs encounter within-tenure settling up? A multiperiod perspective on executive pay and dismissal

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 719-739

  Wowak, Adam J ^a   Hambrick, Donald C ^b   Henderson, Andrew D ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052101332     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2011.64869961     Document Type: Review

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