Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1315-1357

  Fee, C Edward ^a   Hadlock, Charles J ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242710644     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhg031     Document Type: Article

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