Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation

Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-440

  Bohannan, Christina ^a   Hovenkamp, Herbert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust law; Competition; Economic growth; Innovation; Intellectual property law; IP rights; Reforms

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960956339     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738830.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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