Forty years of wondering in the wilderness and no closer to the promised land: Bilski's superficial textualism and the missed Opportunity to return patent law to its technology mooring

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 63, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1289-1314

  Menell, Peter S ^a  

^a Berkeley Center for Law and Technology ^*  (United States)

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EID: 79955141345     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (155)

1. See Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (mem.).
2. See infra Part I.D.
3. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093-1100 (1987) (noting that the Court tended to hear about one hundred fifty cases per year in the mid- to late 1980s).
4. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 587-630 (2009) (noting that the Court tended to hear about eighty cases per year in the mid- to late 2000s).
5. See infra Part I.E.
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,472,502 (filed Aug. 16, 1982) (claiming the Lactoba-cillus bacteria malolactic gene); U.S. Patent No. 4,680,264 col.16 l.16 (filed July 1, 1983) (using the term "isolated DNA").
8. See Numbers 14:33 ("And your children shall be wanderers in the wilderness forty years.").
9. Michael L. Kiklis, Bilski v. Kappos: Back to 1981, Computer & Internet Law., Oct. 2010, at 1, 1 ("With the Bilski decision, the Supreme Court has finally spoken again and sent us back to 1981." (footnote omitted));
10. Michael Risch, Forward to the Past, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 333-365 (2010).
11. Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1.
12. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (invalidating patents on isolated naturally occurring DNA compounds and diagnostic tests based on those compounds).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
14. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see 1 Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 2:1 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing scholarship on the interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause).
16. See The Federalist No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors." (emphasis added)); see also 1 Lipscomb, supra note 13, § 2:1, at 71-73 (describing Pinckney's and Madison's likely roles in drafting the clause).
17. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (emphasis added).
18. See 1 Lipscomb, supra note 13, § 2:1, at 83-84.
19. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (observing that the patent power is a "qualified authority... [which] is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts'").
20. See Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 5, 10 (1966) ("No historical writings or events have been found analyzing the [Intellectual Property Clause]....").
21. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that the patent right, "constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the useful arts-the process today called technological innovation").
22. Tench Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures 17-18 (Philadelphia, Aitken & Sons 1787).
23. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (1791), reprinted in The Reports of Alexander Hamilton 115, 175-76 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964); see also The Federalist No. 8, supra note 14, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (distinguishing between "the arts of industry, and the science of finance").
24. See, e.g., Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 487, 496 (1952) ("It seems clear that 'useful arts' (as a unitary technical term) embraced the so-called industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the 18th century....");
25. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 83-87 (1950) (explaining that "useful arts" meant what we now call "technology," or "applied science");
26. Seidel, supra note 18, at 10 (suggesting that "useful Arts" in 1787 connoted useful or helpful trades).
27. W. Kenrick, An Address to the Artists and Manufacturers of Great Britain 21-38 (London, Domville 1774) (contrasting "useful arts" with "polite arts"); Coulter, supra note 22, at 494-96;
28. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139-1164 (1999).
29. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 319-20.
30. George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions 1-8 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1867).
31. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 729 (1881) (holding patentable a process of breaking down fat molecules into fatty acids and glycerine); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) ("A process is... an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."); Curtis, supra note 25, at 8-15.
32. Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 916 (3d ed. 2002).
33. Curtis, supra note 25, at xxiv.
34. Id. § 9.
35. See id. §§ 9-19.
36. William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 159 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890) (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788).
37. Id. § 165.
38. See id. § 166 ("Every invention, when applied according to the design of its inventor, must accomplish some change in the character or condition of material objects.").
39. R. Carl Moy, Moy's Walker on Patents § 5:28 (4th ed. 2007) ("Until recently it had been considered well established that [business] methods were non-statutory.").
40. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).
41. Id. at 174-75.
42. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1854).
43. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5 (1952) ("[T]he principal purpose of the bill is the codification of title 35, United States Code and involves simplification and clarification of language and arrangement, and elimination of obsolete and redundant provisions.... The major changes or innovations in the title consist of incorporating a requirement for invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in § 271.").
44. See id. at 6 (" 'Art' in this place in the [prior] statute has a different meaning than the words 'useful art' in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word 'art' in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with process or method.").
45. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 100, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006)).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6.
47. 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
48. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 161, 176-77 (1993).
49. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50-54 (1949).
50. See, e.g., 1 Anthony William Deller, Walker on Patents § 18 (1937).
51. Id. § 22 (citing numerous cases);
52. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 393-94 (1960) ("Of course, not every kind of an invention can be patented. Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention because it is outside of the enumerated categories of 'process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.' Also outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper service.").
53. The unpatentability of business methods was also well settled within the Patent Office and courts as early as 1869. See Ex parte Abraham, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 59.
54. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id. at 70.
57. Id. at 72.
58. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
59. Id. at 594.
60. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
61. See id. at 183-89.
62. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
63. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996).
64. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
65. See, e.g., Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora's Box, Recorder, Jan. 1999, at 20, 20 (warning that "a firestorm of litigation threatens to engulf corporate America" and predicting "large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp operators move to patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting"); Jaret Seiberg, Ruling Threatens Banks with Patent Lawsuits, Am. Banker, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3, 3 (asserting that the State Street decision "threatens to embroil the financial services industry in hundreds of patent infringement lawsuits," creating possible liability exceeding $2 billion).
66. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5 (1952) (explaining that Congress divided Title 35 into three distinct parts: I. Patent Office, II. Patentability of Inventions and Grant of Patents, and III. Patents and Protection of Patent Rights).
67. Justice Scalia declined to join two sections of the majority opinion. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
68. See id. at 3226 ("This Court has not indicated that the existence of these well-established exceptions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute's purpose and design.");
69. id. at 3229 (plurality opinion) (noting that limitations on patentable subject matter must be "consistent with the statutory text");
70. id. at 3231 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with the Act's text.");
71. id. ("[W]e by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit's development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.").
72. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
73. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
74. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
75. Id. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
76. Id. at 3225 (omission in original) (parallel citations omitted).
77. See supra Part I.A.
78. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
79. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
80. See infra Part IV.
81. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See id. at 3225.
84. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 ("Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a 'process' did not change with the addition of that term to § 101.").
85. See supra Part I.C.
86. See supra Part I.C.
87. See supra Part I.C.
88. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989) ("Under established canons of statutory construction, 'it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912))), superseded by statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
89. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (referring to Webster's New International Dictionary 1548 (2d ed. 1954), which defines "method" as "[a]n orderly procedure or process... regular way or manner of doing anything; hence, a set form of procedure adopted in investigation or instruction").
90. See supra Part I.E.
91. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
92. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (omission in original) (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003);
93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (noting that Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes").
94. H.R. Rep. 82-1923, at 5 (1952).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006) (providing definitions of terms "[w]hen used in this title").
96. Id. § 273(a) (emphasis added).
97. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
98. Id. at 3227.
99. Id. at 3231.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3227 (plurality opinion).
102. Id. at 3231 (majority opinion).
103. Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2644-54 (1994) (examining the political economy of software protection).
104. Mark Walsh, Bowing to Reality, Software Maker Begins Building a Patent Portfolio, Recorder (San Francisco), Aug. 17, 1995, at 1 ("[W]hile [Oracle Corp., a leading relational database company] says it still [opposes software patents], it has... embarked on an aggressive program to secure patents for its software products-primarily to protect itself against potential infringement claims, in the face of a sharp increase in recent years in the number of software patents issued by the PTO.").
105. See Menell, supra note 92, at 2652.
106. Tom Krazit, Oracle Sues Google over Android and Java, CNET News (Aug. 12, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-20013546-265.html.
107. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 217 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, "the spokesmen for the organized patent bar have uniformly favored patentability and industry representatives have taken positions properly motivated by their economic self-interest," and that, "[n]otwithstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the software industry, commentators have noted that 'this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it'" (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
108. See id. at 218 (noting PTO opposition to software patents on policy, administration, and legal grounds); President's Comm'n on the Patent Sys., "To Promote the Progress of... Useful Arts" 13 (1966) (recommending against patent protection for computer software).
109. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 27, at 151 (noting that the PTO stopped petitioning for certiorari when its patentable subject matter rejections were overturned by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Federal Circuit).
110. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 334-53 (2003).
111. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287 (2010).
112. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1971 (2005).
113. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
114. See supra Part III.
115. Jonathan R. Siegel, Naïve Textualism in Patent Law, 76 Brook. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011);
116. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20-22 (1988) (contrasting "archeological" and "nautical" approaches to interpretation);
117. William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361-1392 (1988) ("[A]ren't most statutes common law statutes, to the extent that they have gaps and ambiguities which Congress fully expects the judiciary to fill?");
118. Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429-436 (discussing "the issue of integrating statutory and other law").
119. Judge Frank Easterbrook, among the intellectual founders of textualism, recognizes that some "common law statutes" permit evolution of meaning as applied over time.
120. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533-544 (1983) ("The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.").
121. The antitrust laws are a prime example. See Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1377 (addressing common law statutes, such as the Sherman Act, where "Congress has declared an important public policy in general, sweeping terms, and has essentially left the courts free to mold the contours of that policy"); Note
122. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is There a Text in This Class?" The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 619-620 (2005) ("Antitrust cases generally discuss precedent and economic policy. They rarely include more than a passing citation to the statutory text.").
123. Patentability boiled down to the following terse formulation: "[W]hen any person... shall allege that he... invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement... not known or used before the application... a patent may be granted therefor...." Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-20.
124. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 51 (2010); see also Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) ("Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patentee."); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100) (drawing from common law tort principles to hold that "all are tort-feasors, engaged in a common purpose to infringe the patent, and actually, by their concerted action, producing that result");
125. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 941-1005 (2007) (chronicling parallel developments in copyright jurisprudence).
126. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936) (describing the tensions between common law and statutory interpretation at the dawn of the New Deal).
127. Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 254 (1961);
128. see also, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) ("Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent."); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (Story, J.) (inferring that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects").
129. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1854) (Curtis, J.) (establishing the doctrine of equivalents). It is perhaps no coincidence that he practiced patent law before his appointment to the bench, see O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 63 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 156 (1853), and that his brother, George Ticknor Curtis, authored the leading patent treatise of the era. See supra note 25.
130. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.). Judge Learned Hand's integrated interpretive approach-combining deep understanding of statutes, common law reasoning, and pragmatic insight-established key components of the modern intellectual property system. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (establishing the framework for copyright infringement analysis); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1917) (Hand, J., concurring) (establishing the noncompetitive goods doctrine in trademark law). He was, of course, renowned for his common law jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
131. See Prager, supra note 109, at 254 (observing Justice Story "was uninhibited in interpreting words into and out of [the Patent Act]"). The formative cases amply illustrate the common law tradition. See, e.g., The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (enablement); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881) (accidental anticipation doctrine); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1878) (experimental-use exception to statutory bar); Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (doctrine of equivalents); Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (interplay of written description and patentability); Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (limits on patentable subject matter); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851) (nonob-viousness requirement); Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121 (experimental-use defense).
132. See supra Part I.C.
133. Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293-304.
134. See Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 266-67.
135. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1966) ("[Hotchkiss] gave birth to 'invention' as a word of legal art signifying patentable inventions.... The Hotchkiss formulation, however, lies not in any label, but in its functional approach to questions of patentability.").
136. Compare Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard...."), with Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 (upholding the 1952 Patent Act's formulation of the nonobviousness requirement, which abolished the "flash of creative genius" standard).
137. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152 (invalidating a patent on a commercially successful mechanical device as "wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences"); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (describing "the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling").
138. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 18 (1952) ("[I]t is immaterial whether [the invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.").
139. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) ("In Graham..., the Court set out a framework for applying the statutory language of § 103, language itself based on the logic of the earlier decision in Hotchkiss... and its progeny.").
140. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 17 ("Section 101 follows the wording of the existing statute as to the subject matter for patents, except that reference to plant patents has been omitted for incorporation in section 301 and the word 'art' has been replaced by 'process', which is defined in section 100.").
141. See id. ("No change is made in [§ 102(a)-(c)] other than that due to division into lettered paragraphs. The interpretation by the courts of paragraph (a) as being more restricted than the actual language would suggest (for example, 'known' has been held to mean 'publicly known') is recognized but no change in the language is made at this time.").
142. See id. ("Paragraph (e) is new and enacts the rule of Milburn v. Davis-Bournonville....").
143. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2006); H.R. Rep. 82-1923, at 9 (observing that, although there is "no declaration of what constitutes infringement in the present statute," "[t]he doctrine of contributory infringement has been part of our law for about 80 years").
144. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1997) (rejecting petitioner's argument that the doctrine of equivalents failed to survive the Patent Act of 1952, notwithstanding the lack of any textual support for the doctrine); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961) (holding that the new section defining infringement "left intact the entire body of case law on direct infringement").
145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146. Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689-691 (2007) ("[J]urists once... held that patents were protected under the Takings Clause.").
147. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal intellectual property suits against states in federal court).
148. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99-160 (2000).
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. See Frickey, supra note 101.
151. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239-45 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
152. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
153. See 1 Deller, supra note 45, at 69 (recognizing that "a system of cash-registering and checking for hotels" can be distinguished from "the physical means of conducting the system").
154. See supra Part I.B; see also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
155. Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility-A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 387 (2011) (exploring the challenges of determining patentability of molecular biology and other information age inventions).