Real copyright reform

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-55

  Litman, Jessica ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

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EID: 78651290002     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (480)

1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1205 (2006)).
2. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-34,54-63,122-45 (2d ed- 2006). Compare, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § i(e),35Stat. 1075 (defining scope of and exceptions to exclusive right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit), with Copyright Act of 1976 § 110 (listing exemptions from public performance right).
3. LITMAN, supra note 2, at 57-63,197-202.
4. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009); Fair Copyright in Research Works Act of 20og, H.R. 801, 111th Cong. (2009); Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); Intellectual Property Enforcement Act of 2007, S. 2317, 110th Cong. (2007); Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
5. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); Satellite Home Viewing Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat 3393 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C).
6. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2), 114.
7. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,1902, S. Doc. No. 57-6, at 64 (2d Sess. 1902), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1902.pdf; Zechariah Chafee.Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1,45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 515-16 (1945).
8. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
9. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
10. Perhaps the best-known example is the meaning of the word "publication" under sections 10 and 19 of the 1909 Copyright Act.
11. See Am. Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1956) ("[T]he courts apply different tests of publication depending on whether plaintiff is claiming protection because he did not publish and hence has a common law claim of infringement-in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute 'publication'-or whether he is claiming under the copyright statute-in which case the requirements for publication are quite narrow."). Compare Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding dial distribution of one hundred copies without notice to small group constituted general publication and divested copyright), and White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding distribution of twenty copies with a cover letter suggesting recipients pass the copies on constituted divestive general publication), with King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding Uiat distribution of many copies to the press from the press tent was only a limited publicaton, which did not forfeit copyright). Today we see somediing similar widi computer-mediated uses: Copyright owners have persuaded courts diat a work is fixed for the purpose of the creation of an infringing copy as soon as it appears in the random access memory ("RAM") of a computer, but do not argue that appearance in RAM is sufficient fixation for the purpose of copyright's vesting. Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Similarly, copyright owners have argued that the transmission of a single copy over a network should count as publication for the purposes of infringement, but have denied that transmitting a single copy triggers the Library of Congress deposit obligations that attach to a work upon initial publication.
12. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 407.
13. See LlTMAN, supra note 2, at 47-50.
14. For a current analogue, see, for example, Principles for User Generated Content Services, UGCPRINCIPLES, http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
15. See LlTMAN, supra note 2, at 48-63, 122-45. It's commonplace that copyright rights keep expanding. U.S. copyright statutes are worse, doubling in size faster than healthcare or tuition costs.
16. See, e.g., Pam Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://bdj.org/data/articles/25-3/cpp.pdf (reporting conclusions of three-year project that invited a group of twenty copyright experts "to explore whether it was possible to reach some consensus about how current copyright law could be improved and how the law's current problems could be mitigated");
17. A Special Conversation with Marybeth Peters, AUDIO ARCHIVE (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.archive.org/ details/FMCsummito7.petersconversation (describing unsuccessful negotiations among music and recording industry interests to reform 17 U.S.C. § 115).
18. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, Pols OK Bill on Royalties, VARIETY, May 14, 2009, 2009 WLNR 9209693 (describing lobbying over bill to require radio broadcasters to pay performance royalties to the owners of sound recording copyrights);
19. Wendy Davis, Entertainment Industry Pushes for Law Requiring Colleges To Filler Networks, MEDIAPOST (March 24, 2008), hup://pubIications.mediapost.com/ index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.san&s=79058&Nid=40725&p=918739 (describing lobbying over bill to require colleges to block students' peer-to-peer file sharing).
20. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Bertelsmann, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (seeking to expand the scope of secondary liability for copyright infringement);
21. Brief for Americans for Tax Reform as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 15-17, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv (L), 07-1511-cv (CON)) (arguing that momentary transient reproduction in computer's RAM violates § 106(1));
22. Brief for ASCAP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 17-19, Viacom Int'l v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 07 Civ. 2103 (LIS), 07 Civ. 3582 (LLS), 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y.June 23, 2010) (seeking a narrow construction of the scope of the Internet service provider safe harbors in 17 U.S.C. §512);
23. Brief for Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. as Amici Curiae at 14-20, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497) (claiming that making a file available for distribution violates 106(3)).
24. See generally LlTMAN, supra note 2, at 24.
25. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright Unbound, in AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS), at WEIN-1, WEIN-1 (Iris C. Geik et al. eds., 2005).
26. See Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1 (2006).
27. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 39-40 and sources there cited.
28. See id. at 42-45.
29. See Litman, supra note 9, at 326-32 and sources there cited.
30. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998) (codified at 17U.S.C. §§ 101, 108, 109, 112, 114, 512, 1301).
31. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 127-45 and sources there cited. During the same five-year period, composers, music publishers, and motion picture studies pursued an extension of copyright's term from seventy-five (or life plus fifty) years to ninety-five (or life plus seventy) years. Bar and restaurant owners, angry at the cost of performing rights licenses, blocked term extension until proponents agreed to insert a bar and restaurant exemption into the term-extension bill.
32. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 845-46 (2009) ("Hundreds of millions of Internet users are downloading, altering, mixing, uploading, and/or making available audio, video, and text content on personal web pages, social sites, or using peer-to-peer technology to allow others to access content on their computer."). According to YouTube, "People are watching 2 billion videos a day on YouTube and uploading hundreds of thousands of videos daily. In fact, every minute, 24 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube." YouTube Fact Sheet, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.eom/t/fact-sheet (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). The Wall Street Journal reported in August 2009 that "YouTube has grown into a massive destination, with 428 million unique monthly visitors in June." Jessica E. Vascellaro, YouTube Pumps More Ads into Lineup, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2009, at B1.
33. In June of 2009, Sweden's Pirate Party, founded in 2006 with a platform of IP reform, captured enough votes to win a seat on the European Parliament. See Mats Lewan, Ahoy! Pirate Party Gets Berth in European Parliament, CNET (June 8, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578-3-10259048-38.html. In Canada, University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist had notable success using Facebook and his personal blog to organize opposition to Canadian copyright reform proposals.
34. See MICHAEL GEIST BLOC, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/; Government Retreats on Copyright Reform, CBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/technology/ story/2007/12/13/tech-copyright-delay.html.
35. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE LJ. 804 (2008);
36. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 3 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007).
37. See, e.g., LlTMAN, supra note 2.
38. A note on terminology: In this article, unless I am referring to specific statutory categories, I use the word "creator" rather than "author," "disseminate" rather than "distribute," and "enjoy" rather than "use." I do that primarily to avoid the baggage that "author," "distribute," and "use" have accumulated over the past few decades. By "creator," I intend to name the individuals who make works of authorship, to the exclusion of the entities and employers who finance their work, whether or not diose individuals are deemed "audiors" in current or past copyright laws. By "disseminate," I intend to encompass any means of making a work available to members of the public, whether or not diat behavior is within the exclusive rights granted by copyright law. By "enjoy," I mean reading, listening, viewing, playing, learning from, and any other use short of commercial exploitation, whether or not current law holds that such use requires a license.
39. See also infra note 54.
40. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright, 46 Hous. L. REV. 215, 383 (2009) (copyright should serve "the public interest in the creadon, transmission, and use of knowledge"). Patterson and Birch argue that while conventional copyright theory envisioned a bilateral relationship between author and user, it should instead be based on a tripartite relationship among author, publisher, and user. Id.
41. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 7 (1994);
42. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2001). As Diane Zimmerman has recendy reminded us, the soundness of the basic copyright incentive theory is, so far, merely theoretical.
43. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2011), available/http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515964.
44. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 117-19 (2009).
45. See, e.g., TODD LONDON ET AL, OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE NEW AMERICAN PLAY 2 (2009) (Theatre Development Fund study finding a "system of theatrical production that has become increasingly alienating to individual artists and inhospitable to the cultivation of new work for the stage");
46. Michael Cieply, Films Finding a Tougher Market in Toronto, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at C1 (reporting diat the vast majority of independent films shown at the 2009 Toronto film festival failed to find an American distributor);
47. Jon Pareles, 1,700 Bands, Rocking as the CD Industry Reels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 ("There's never a shortage of eager musicians. Many bands drive cross-country by van or cross an ocean to perform an unpaid showcase at South By Southwest, and the most determined ones play not only their one festival slot but also half a dozen peripheral parties as well, hoping to be noticed.");
48. BEFORE THE MUSIC DIES (B-Side Entertainment 2006) (documentary film about the music and recording industries).
49. See, e.g., American Idol (FOX television series 2002-2010);
50. see also Pareles, supra note 31.
51. See, e.g., On the Lot (FOX television series 2007);
52. Project Greenlight (HBO 2001-2005).
53. See, e.g., Grease: You're the One that I Want (NBC television series 2007);
54. High School Musical: Get in the Picture (ABC 2008);
55. Legally Blond the Musical- The Search for EUe Woods (MTV television series 2008).
56. See Randy Kennedy, When Art Meets TV, Realism Might Not Make It to Reality, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at C1 (hundreds of painters audition for new reality show to discover unknown visual artists).
57. See Work of Art: The Next Great Artist (BRAVO television series 2010).
58. See The Shot (VHI television series 2007) (reality show competition among still photographers for "$100,000, the chance to shoot a fashion spread for Marie Claire magazine, and have their shot on the cover of a Victoria Secret catalog").
59. See, e.g., DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 68-98, 386-91, 398-404 (5th ed. 2003);
60. Herman Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104U.PA.L.REV. 1025,1051 (1956);
61. BEFORE THE MUSIC DIES, supra note 31.
62. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967);
63. PATRY, supra note 30, at 117;
64. Graeme W. Austin, Keynote Address, 28 COLUM.J.L. &ARTS 397 (2004).
65. See LONDON ET AL., supra note 31, at 50-80 (reporting that even successful playwrights cannot make a living from their plays); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Musicians, Singers and Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocoso95.pdf ("Part-time schedules-typically at night and on weekends-intermittent unemployment, and rejection when auditioning for work are common; many musicians and singers supplement their income with earnings from other sources.");
66. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Artists and Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocoso92. htm ("Actors endure long periods of unemployment, intense competition for roles, and frequent rejections in auditions⋯. Because earnings may be erratic, many actors, producers, and directors supplement their incomes by holding jobs in other fields.").
67. For other examples, see Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 9-10.
68. See, e.g., THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 8 (2010), http://www.ccianet org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/fair-use- study-final.pdf ("In 2007, fair use industries generated revenue of $4.7 trillion, a 36 percent increase over 2002 revenue of $3.4 trillion.");
69. STEPHEN E. SlWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003-2007 REPORT 3 (June 2009), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2003-07.pdf ("By 2007 ⋯ the value added to the U.S. GDP by the 'total' copyright industries rose to $1.52 trillion ⋯ or 11.05% of U.S. GDP.").
70. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2006). The United States is one of a small number of countries to have a work made for hire doctrine, and even among countries diat deem employers to be authors of some works, the scope of the U.S. doctrine is unusually broad.
71. The law makes copyright assignment easy. See id. § 204. Once the copyright is assigned, the new copyright owner stands in the shoes of the original author, and will be entitled to exercise almost all copyright rights, including the right to sue the original creator for copyright infringement.
72. See, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (thirty-five or forty years after grant); id. % 304(c)(3) (fifty-six years after copyright first secured);
74. id. § 304(d)(2) (seventy-five years after copyright first secured only if the § 304(c) termination opportunity was foregone).
75. See generally Howard Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Work Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985);
76. Allison M. Scott, Note, Oh Bother: Milne, Steinbeck, and an Emerging Circuit Split over the Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357 (2007).
77. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
78. See COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/crb/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010);
79. SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
80. See, e.g., Gabe Bloch, Note, Transformation in Publishing: Modeling the Effect of New Media, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 647 (2005). Creators in some industries have additional clout as a consequence of unionization and collective bargaining, but must usually give up their copyrights as a condition of employment.
81. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 573 (2010). Recent court rulings reading the copyright statute to require copyright owner permission for even tiny uses of expression from copyrighted works,
82. see, for example, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), have exacerbated the problem. If creators must seek myriad licenses from multiple sources before releasing their works to the public, they will need to rely on the licensing resources of a major distributor.
83. See Copyright Criminals: This Is a Sampling Sport (PBS television broadcast Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.copyrightcriminals.com/.An additional factor in the disparity is the large capital investment once required to engage in mass distribution of an author's works. See infra text accompanying note 49.
84. See generally LlTMAN, supra note 2. This isn't a recent phenomenon. Anglo-American copyright law originated as a law by and for printers and publishers and has always been distributor-centric.
85. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 1-37;
86. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 42-178 (1968);
87. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OFCOPYRIGHT 10-66 (1993).
88. See, e.g., KAPLA0N, supra note 39, at 5-9, 75-78.
89. See, e.g.. An Update: Piracy on University Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6-8 (2007) [hereinafter An Update: Piracy on University Network, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110u/33812. PDF (testimony of Cary Sherman, President, Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")) (complaining that universities have failed to stop "piracy where it is most rampant");
90. id. at 75-77 (letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA")) (attributing forty-four percent of the film industry's domestic losses to college students); Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Porf-Grokster World: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16-17 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=iog-senate- hearings&docid=f:34i 13.pdf (testimony of Marty Roe, Recording Artist, Arista Records) (stating that peer-to-peer businesses have forced musicians and songwriters to abandon their music careers);
91. id. at 18 (testimony of Cary Sherman) (stating that peer-to-peer is the reason that "[t]housands of individuals engaged in the music, film and other entertainment industries have seen their jobs disappear");
92. INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES' GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR 2009, http://www.iipa.com/pdf/HPA2009GlobalChallenges.pdf ("Internet piracy, from infringing websites, top site pre-release groups, to unauthorized [peer-to-peer] file sharing, has undergone explosive growth, hindering legitimate electronic commerce opportunities and causing mounting losses to the music, movie, videogame, business software and publishing industries.").
93. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 75-76;
94. L. Ray Patterson, Fair Use for Teaching and Research: The Folly of Kinko's and Texaco, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY 351,356-63 (Laura N. Gasawayed., 1997).
95. Eg., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
96. See generally Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149 (1998).
97. The literature discussing the public's interest in copyright is struggling with the issue of just what should we call the folks who read, listen to, look at, watch, play, run, and build works of authorship. Popular choices include "users,"
98. see Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005);
99. Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, "consumers," see Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119 (2007);
100. Joseph Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003), and "fans," see Fred Von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.law.com/jsp/article. jspJidsi095434496352.
101. See also Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) ("non- owners"). In this Article, I call individuals enjoying copyrighted works "readers" or "readers, listeners, and viewers."
102. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 25-36;
103. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
104. The statute's express user exemptions provisions are idiosyncratic, and most of them trace their origin from ill-considered lawsuits. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (allowing resale of lawfully made copies), id. § 109(c) (permitting people to play videogames in public places),
105. id. § no(5)(A) (permitting people to play radio and television broadcasts in public places), and id. §110(11) (permitting in-home use of cens orware to block the sexual or violent scenes in movies released on DVDs), with Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (rejecting infringement claim for playing radio in small restaurant), Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (rejecting infringement claim for discount book resale), Red Baron-Franklin Park Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F. 2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding arcade liable for public performance of videogames), and Cleanflicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (enjoining commercial entities from editing commercially released DVDs to remove sexual or violent content).
106. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 932-42 (2005);
107. L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry into a Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385 (1992).
108. See, e.g.. The Performance Rights Act and Parity Among Music Delivery Platforms: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the fudiciary, 111 th Cong. 9-11 (2009) [hereinafter The Performance Rights Act], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111-senate- hearings&docid=f:54557.pdf (testimony of Marian Leighton-Levy, Founder and Owner, Rounder Records);
109. see also id. at 14 (testimony of Ralph Oman, Lecturer, George Washington University, and former Register of Copyrights) ("It comes down to this, ⋯ [a]s a matter of property rights, men and women who create and own a copyrighted work should have the right to get paid for it by the people who use their works. That is the basic premise of copyright protection.").
110. Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 587,593-96 (2008).
111. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204);
112. RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
113. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, RM 2008-8, Reply Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/dvd-cca-inc-38. pdf;
114. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., RM 2008-8, Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright. gov/1201/2008/responses/mpaa-46.pdf; Software & Info. Indus. Ass'n, RM 2008-8, Reply Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/software-information-industry- assoc-17.pdf.
115. See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 267-81 (2007);
116. Nate Anderson, DRM Still Sucks: Yahoo Music GoingDark, TakingKeys with It, ARS TECHNICA (July 24, 2008, 3:00 PM) http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/ 2008 0724-drm-still-sucks-yahoo-music-going-dark-taking-keys-with-it.html; Cory Doctorow, How To Destroy the Book, Speech Before the National Reading Summit (Nov. 13, 2009), in THE VARSITY, Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://thevasity.ca/articles/23855. There are other problems widi current DRM regimes: some of them give publishers more control over purchased content than consumers have any reason to expect. In July of 2009, for example, Amazon.com resolved a copyright dispute with the publisher of George Orwell's Animal Farm and 1984, by automatically deleting purchased copies of both e-books from purchaser's Kindle e-book readers, and crediting their accounts for a "return."
117. See David Pogue, Pogue's Posts: Some E-Books Are More Equal than Others, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/ some-e-books-are-more-equal-U1an-others/.See generally Updated and Corrected: E-Books Buyer's Guide to Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01 /updated-and-corrected-e-book-buyers-guide- privacy (summarizing privacy-related policies of popular e-book readers).
118. See GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 273-79;
119. Jonn A. Rodichild, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1181, 1198-1205 (2007).
120. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 30, at 161-70 (criticizing copyright industries' misuse of anticircumvention provisions of DMCA);
121. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right To Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 264 (2004) ("If you inquired among the general public, 'What does U.S. copyright law protect'' many people might start by grumbling that it overprotects piggish record companies.");
122. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548-49 (arguing that more sophisticated copyright enforcement has forced us to confront the "vast disparity between what activities the Copyright Act proscribes and what the average American might consider fair or just").
123. Accord PATRY, supra note 30, at xx-xxiv;
124. Paul Edward Cellar, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SoCY U.S.A. 165, 175 (2008);
125. Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 63-67 (2002);
126. see also MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM, at xiii (2009) ("[I]ntellectual property rights do not anymore enjoy the presumption either that they are justified or diat they will endure.").
127. See Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175, 175-80.
128. See Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 727-28 (2008).
129. See generally, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135.
130. See Litman, supra note 66, at 175-80.
131. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 617,619 (2008) (defining "tolerated use" as "infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may be aware, yet does nothing about").
132. See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (enjoining publication of Harry Potter Lexicon)
133. Cease and Desist Notices: Fan Fiction, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (archive of cease and desist letters objecting to fan sites).
134. Sa LlTMAN, supra note 2, at 39-41,47-48, 58-62, 122-45.
135. See id. at 39-47, 58-60, 127-
136. See id. at 114-17.
137. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in the Internet Economy, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1073, 1076-79 (2008). Reidenberg deploys this insight to argue that copyright disobedience is a frontal challenge to the rule of law. Id).
138. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 4-20 (1989);
139. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1907-16 (1990);
140. see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that "copyright protection is essential to finance the publications that distribute" scientific articles, even though authors are not paid for them), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
141. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209 (1983);
142. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982).
143. See, e.g., Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop, of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75-88 (2005) [hereinafter Music Licensing Reform], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 og-senate-hearings&docid=f: 22919.pdf (testimony of Rob Glaser, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, RealNetworks, Inc., for Digital Media Association);
144. id. at 63-74 (testimony of Ismael Cuebas, Director of Merchandising Operations, TransWorld Entertainment Corp., for National Association of Recording Merchandisers).
145. See, e.g., id. at 145-48 (testimony of Irwin Z. Robinson, Chairman and Chief Exececutive Officer, Famous Music Publishing, for National Music Publishers Association).
146. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power ⋯ To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ⋯.").
147. See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 113 (2003).
148. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 41-48 (testimony of Glen Barros, President and Chief Executive Officer, Concord Music Group);
149. id. at 75-78 (testimony of Rob Glaser).
150. Lobbyists for copyright-owning businesses have succeeded in persuading Congress to enact copyright laws that allocate much of the benefit of copyright to intermediaries, and that incorporate powerful benefits for incumbents. This advantage comes in two basic flavors. First, when Congress enacts the rules surrounding a new right, license, or exception, it defines it in narrow terms that fit the current practice of the incumbents who negotiated the statutory provision but are not useful for outsiders. The exception in § 117(c) allowing computer maintenance and repair services to turn on computers for the sole purpose of maintaining or repairing them was drafted widi sufficient narrowness to make it unavailable to people who wish to turn on their computers for other purposes.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006). Second, Congress commonly gives copyright goodies to the incumbents who request them. Thus, when Congress in 1998 extended copyright terms by twenty years, it vested the extended term in current copyright proprietors rather than authors, subject to a narrow and difficult to exercise termination right for a limited class of authors who had not previously sought to recapture their copyrights.
152. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C). The termination provisions, like those for the 1976 extension of the copyright term, make it more difficult to reassign rights under a terminated copyright grant to anyone other dian the original grantee.
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (6) (C)-(D).
154. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78;
155. Editorial, Orphan Works, D-LIB MAGAZINE, June 2006, available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/juneo6/06editorial.html; Anonymous, Showstopper, QUESTIONCOPYRlGHT.ORG (Jan. 5, 2010, 23:49), http://questioncopyright.org/ showstopper.
156. See, e.g., Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Section 115 of the Copyright Act]; Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts: Balancing the Interests of Sound Recording Copyright Owners with Those of Broadcasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22-37 (2004) (testimony of Dan Halyburton, Senior Vice President/General Manager of Group Operations, Susquehanna Radio Corp., on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters) [hereinafter Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts].
157. Under 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(2), any subset of copyright rights may be transferred and owned separately. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(2). The law does not require the owner of a copyright or any portion of a copyright to register her claim, and registration of transfers of parts of a copyright are rare. That makes it difficult for entities seeking to negotiate a license to determine the identity of the appropriate licensor.
158. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) ("[Divisibility] has long been sought by authors and their representatives, and ⋯ has attracted wide support from other groups ⋯.").
159. See, e.g.. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
160. Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 565-74 (1997);
161. Jessica Litman, Sharing df Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.LJ. 1, 18-23 (2005);
162. Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673,689-702 (2003);
163. Stadler, supra note, 67, at 732.
164. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831 (W.D. Pa. 2000);
165. Non-waiver of Rights, SOUNDEXCHANGE (Nov. 5, 2009), http://soundexchange. com/?s= non+waiver+of+rights.
166. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (CD. Cal. 2004);
167. Copyright.net Music Publ'g LLC v. MP3.com, 256 F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
168. John Borland, iCraveTV.corn's Exec Discusses His Start-up's Short Life, CNET (Feb. 29, 2000), http://news.cnet.c0m/2100-1033-237450.html.
169. I am indebted to Michael Carroll for this insight See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. ClN. L. REV. 1405, 1494-95 (2003).
170. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908);
171. Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584 (D. Mass. 1888);
172. see also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901) (holding that it is not copyright infringement to make and sell wax cylinders for phonographs).
173. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1205 (2006)).
174. See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929);
175. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926);
176. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925);
177. M. Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923). Early radio broadcaster defendants were often manufacturers or sellers of radio receiving sets who operated broadcast stations to promote the sale of their radios.
178. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 298 F. at 629.
179. Buck v.Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931);
180. Gen. Elec. Co., 16F.2d829.
181. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734;
182. Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929), rev'd sub nom. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191;
183. see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975);
184. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
185. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
186. See generally Authorizing Royalties for Musical Compositions on Coin-Operated Machines: Hearing on H.R 5921 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1959) [hereinafter Authorizing Royalties].
187. See Act of Mar. 4, § 1 (e). See generally Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350-54 (2002).
188. Authorizing Royalties, supra note 97, at 3.
189. Id. at 6 (remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
190. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 59-61 (1965). The jukebox exemption remained in the law until 1976, when it was replaced by a lighdy enforced compulsory license at a nominal $8 annual rate. Congress replaced the compulsory license with a voluntary blanket license in 1989 when it ratified the Berne Convention.
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
192. See generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED (2002).
193. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (CD. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,464 U.S. 417 (1984).
194. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,456 (1984).
195. Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90-CrV-4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jul. 9, 1990).
196. See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, Pt 1 (1992).
197. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006)). One of the law's provisions prohibits copyright infringement suits against consumers for noncommercial copying of musical recordings; the scope of that provision remains controversial.
198. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (CD. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). The court refused to enter the injunction. 180 F.3d at 1081.
199. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2680 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332).
200. See Saul Hansell, Bits Debate: Should Internet Service Providers Block Copyrighted Works, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2008, 11:41 AM), http://bits.blogs. nyrimes.com/2008/01/15/bits-debate-should-internet-providers-block-copyrighted- works; Mehan Jayasuriya, Jef Pearlman, Robb Topolski, Michael Weinberg & Sherwin Siy, Forcing the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering Is Not a Viable Solution for U.S. ISPs, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (2009), http://www. publicknowledge. org/pdf/pk-fil tering-whitepaper-200907.pdf.
201. Defendants who worry that a court may be reluctant to leave copyright owners with no remedy may determine that throwing non-party alleged direct infringers under the bus is a better strategy than insisting diat no infringement has occurred.
202. See, e.g.. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130-33 (2d Cir. 2008);
203. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160-63 (9th Cir. 2007);
204. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (CD. Cal. 2009).
205. E.g., MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 925-27 (2005);
206. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001);
207. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999).
208. See Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008).
209. Copyright scholars have, in fact, made a number of thoughtful proposals for recasting copyright law to give greater benefit to authors or to the public.
210. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FlSHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004);
211. Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286-88;
212. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003);
213. Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 981 (2007);
214. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551. As far as I can discern, none of these proposals seems to have attracted serious legislative attention.
215. E.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding diat making a copy available for patrons to view in a non-circulating library violated the distribution right);
216. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.gd 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that photocopying articles for scientific research purposes was not fair use); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (gdi Cir. 1993) (holding that turning on a computer violates the reproduction right of the owner of the copyright in the operating-system software); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that downloading a recorded music file does not perform it).
217. E.g., Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (holding that downloading a recorded music file does not perform it). The usual outcome is for the two sides to agree on legislation that accepts the general principle underlying the heroic, implausible victory while rejecting its application in factual situations similar to those presented in the lawsuit. SeeLitman, supra note 59, at 592-93. Thus, MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d 511, held that a computer-maintenance service made infringing copies of software when it turned on computers to service them. The holding was a surprising and controversial reading of the statutory language.
218. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, COMMS OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21. As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress enacted an express exemption for computer-maintenance services to turn on computers to service them, but, bowing to industry pressure, didn't repudiate the surprising general conclusion that turning on a computer, without more, could constitute infringement of the copyright in the computer's operating-system software.
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006).
220. See, e.g., Karen Dearne, Secrecy Claims on Copyright Treaty, AUSTRALIAN IT, Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/o,24897,24202770- 5013044,00.html.
221. See generally Section 115 of the Copyright Act, supra note 85; Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts, supra note 85. This posture has made resolution of the music and sound recording licensing provisions of §§ 114 and 115 elusive.
222. See, e.g., Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform Parity for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 108th Cong. 1-3 (2007) (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 31-33 (testimony of Judy Collins, recording artist); An Update: Piracy on University Networks, supra note 51, at 1-3 (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 6-8 (testimony of Cary Sherman); Content Protection in the Digital Age: The Broadcast Flag, High-Definition Radio, and the Analog Hole: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on thejudiciary, 109th Cong. 6-8 (2005) thereinafter Content Protection in the Digital Age] (testimony of Dan Glickman); id. at 11-13 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, RIAA).
223. See Litman, supra note 59, at 595-99.
224. See Ginsburg, supra note 81;
225. see also, e.g., Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004. Hearing on H.R. 2517 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop, of the H.Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 61-66 (2003) (testimony of Maren Christensen, Vice President, Intellectual Property Counsel, Universal Studios).
226. See, e.g., Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law-Ignore at Your Own Peril, PCWORLD (July 30, 2003, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 111657/full-disclosure-copyright-lawignore-at-your-own-peril.html.
227. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 81-86;
228. Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege: Reflections of an In-House Counsel, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 387 (2006).
229. See, e.g., Joint Study on 17 U.S.C. Sections iog and 117: Public Hearing Before the U.S. Copyright Office and the Nat'l Telecomms. &Info. Admin. (2000), available at http://www.copyright gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/ transcript.pdf (testimony of Steven Metalitz, representing American Film Marketing Association and six other trade groups); Brief of Americans for Tax Reform as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance at 15-20, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-151 1-cv(CON)), 2007 WL 6101600.
230. See, e.g., Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts, supra note 85, at 37-39 (testimony of Steven M. Marks, General Counsel, RIAA).
231. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (critiquing argument).
232. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 62;
233. Cohen, supra note 125;
234. Zimmerman, supra note 29;
235. supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
236. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 62;
237. David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (2004);
238. Zimmerman, supra note 29.
239. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 54-80 (2008). "Compared with their early American counterparts, current copyright holders enjoy a capacious bundle of rights in many more uses of many more types of published works for a far greater time and with fewer preconditions." Id. at 55.
240. During the fifteen to twenty years that digital dissemination has emerged as a viable alternative to distribution of hard copies using factories, store-fronts and trucks, the copyright owner's legal control over potential uses of protected works has grown, rather than ebbed, through a massive, almost entirely non-statutory, expansion of the scope of copyright rights. See id. at 60-80;
241. Litman, supra note 59, at 593-96.
242. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801-04 (2000).
243. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 870-93 (2001).
244. See, e.g., I. Fred Koenigsberg, The Fifth Annual Christopher A Meyer Memorial Lecture: Humpty Dumpty in Copyrightland, 51 J. COPYRIGHTSoc'Y U.SA. 677, 689 (2004).
245. McGowan, supra note 127;
246. accord Cohen, supra note 125.
247. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat 2827, 2827-29 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1994) to extend the term of copyright protection for most works to life plus seventy yean).
248. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 (2006)).
249. McGowan, supra note 127, at 26. If people in the copyright-lobbying business believed that such an effect could be demonstrated, you'd expect them to try to collect the data, but perhaps they don't believe that Congress needs any persuasion on the point.
250. See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 664 (2006); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (2007).
251. Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 61;
252. see, e.g., Editorial, We Aren't All Pirates, LA. TIMES, July to, 2006, at Bio.
253. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 30-39, 213-14;
254. Horbaczewski, supra note 123, at 393;
255. Internet Anti-Piracy Task Force, Nat'l Music Publishers Ass'n, The Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet, http://web.archive.0rg/web/2005- 2004re-/http://www.nmpa.org/music 101 /copyrights.asp.
256. See, e.g., Editorial, Buyer Beware: Music, Technology Industries Reach an Agreement That Neglects Consumers' Rights, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2003, at A8; Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A16;
257. Editorial, Grokster and the Information Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A1 8;
258. Editorial, The Genuine Article: Appealing to Consumers' Better Nature May Be a More Effective Way To Curtail Rampant Piracy, LA. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at M2;
259. Editorial, Tune in Fairness for Broadcast Music: Artists, Broadcasters Should Work Together for Solutions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 14, 2009, at 28A;
260. Steven Levy, Info with a Ball and Chain, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 2003, at 59;
261. Music Industry Fight To Block Net Access Hits New Lows, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2002, at 22A.
262. See William Patry, Non-profit, Non-partisan Education in Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Sept 12, 2007, 7:53 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/ 2007/09/non-profit-non-partisan-education-in.html.
263. See Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 701 (2000);
264. see also Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65.
265. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act, supra note 58, at 4-6, 36-38 (testimony of Sheila Escovedo, Recording Artist, MusicFTRST Coalition).
266. See, e.g., David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 345 (2005);
267. Koenigsberg, supra note 132;
268. Randy Picker, Fair Usev. Fair Access, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 603 (2008);
269. Patrick Ross, TheRemix Culture, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (July 7, 2008, 2:50 PM), http://blog.copvrightalliance.org/2008/07/the-remix-culture/.
270. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 144, at 381 ("Time and again, congressional hearings have been tainted with the indefensible agendas of those who have a thinly concealed interest in decreasing copyright protection.");
271. Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 679 ("[E]nemies of creativity ⋯ speak of the fair use 'right.' But there is no 'right' to fair use.");
272. Patrick Ross, Perspective: Fair Use Is Not a Consumer Right, CNET (Sept. 6, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Fair-use-is-not-a-consumer-right/201 0-1030-3-6205977.html.
273. Different scholars have different nominations for which campaigns were the most counterproductive. My own list includes Sony's rootkit
274. see Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.shtm, the effort to expand the distribution right under § 106(3) to encompass "making available,
275. see Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Coats, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 578 n.1 (2008), and the "John Doe" lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file sharers,
276. see, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (MJD/RLE), 2009 WL 1664468 (D. Minn. June 11, 2009).
277. Here, I would point to the prosecution of Dmitry Skylarov and the threat to sue Ed Felten and his research team for presenting a scholarly paper on the team's decryption research on the Secure Digital Music Initiative's technologies.
278. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
279. Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Case No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J, filed June 6, 2001).
280. See Content Protection in the Digital Age, supra note 119, at 6-8 (testimony of Dan Glickman);
281. Jeffrey Cunard, Technological Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright Management Systems: A Brief Survey of the Landscape, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS JUNE 13-17,2001 (Jane C. Ginsburg & June M. Besek eds., 2002), available at http://www.alai-usa.org/2001-conference/pres-cunard.doc;
282. Lionel S. Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 667 (2003).
283. Copyright owners have used digital rights management technologies since the earliest days of digital distribution. In 1998, Congress added provisions to tide 17 prohibiting the circumvention of DRM technologies designed to control access to works and prohibiting the marketing of devices or the provision of services to circumvent a wider category of DRM technologies.
284. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
285. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have To Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2007).
286. See Larry Magid, Podcast: iTunes Cuts Off Palm Pre Sync, CNET (July 16, 2009), http:// news.cnet.com/8301-19518-3-10288094-238.html;
287. Charlie Sorrel, Sync Your Palm Pre with iTunes. Again, WIRED (July 17, 2009), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/07/sync-your-palm-pre-widi-itunes- again/.
288. See, e.g., Walter Mossberg, Some Cures for the Multiple iPod Blues, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at 30 ("[H]ere's how to use an iPod to copy music to multiple computers.");
289. Sorrel, supra note 150 (reviewing third-party workarounds to enable Palm Pre owners to use iTunes);
290. Mac the Hipper, GUSTAVUS ADOPLHUS COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac- the-Ripper (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (explaining that the college has installed software for ripping DVDs to the hard drive of a computer "so that you can copy it" on machines in its media center).
291. J7 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1).
292. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 50-52 (1994).
293. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§112, 203, 304, 1008.
294. See Litman, supra note 59, at 593-94.
295. See 17 U.S.C.§§ 106,106A, 107-122.
296. Compare id. § 110 (5) (A) (permitting the public performance of a broadcast on a single receiving set of the sort found in private homes), with id. § 110(5)(B) (permitting the public performance of the broadcast of only non-dramadc musical works using multiple speakers and display screens).
297. See id. §§ 111(d), 112(e), 114(d), 115, 118, 119, 122;
298. see also id. § 116 ("negotiated" jukebox license).
299. E.g., id. § 114 ("[s]cope of exclusive rights in sound recordings"). Former Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman had diis to say; Somewhere in diis favored land a copyright Pooh-bah really understands Section 111 (eight pages covering secondary transmissions by cable), Section 114 (18 pages covering the scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings and, now, webcasting), Section 115 (almost seven pages covering the compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords, including digital delivery), and Sections 119 and 122 (almost 17 pages covering secondary transmissions by satellite). The current Register of Copyrights, Marybedi Peters, has stated publicly that there are large chunks of Section 114 that are utterly incomprehensible to most people, because over the years Congress has spliced and diced them, and then hemstitched them back together.
300. Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights of Authors Reborn, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 169, 172-73 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
301. E.g., Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1273, as amended by Gesetz [G], Oct 26, 2007, BGBL I at 2513, §§ 29-42 (Ger.) (German provisions on transfers and licenses of copyright);
302. Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual tit. II, ch. Ill, §§ 14-16 (B.O.E. 1996, 1) (Spain's droit morale), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base-datos/Admin/rdlegi-igg6.html#.
303. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2 9.
304. See, e.g., Orphan Works Fact Sheet, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, http://futureofmusic. org/article/fact-sheet/orphan-works (last visited Sept 17, 2010).
305. See, e.g., DUKE Cra. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN, ACCESS TO ORPHAN FILMS 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/cspdorphanfilm. pdf.
306. See Copyright Renewal Provisions: Hearing on S. 756 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 25-31 (1991) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
307. Some copyright contracts are construed by courts to reserve rights to license uses in new media.
308. see, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). Other contracts have express reversion terms, which are common in trade-book publishing contracts, see RICHARD CURTIS, HOW To BE YOUR OWN LITERARY AGENT 106-13 (2003), but not so common in most other fields,
309. see, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 245, 259-61, 392-94, 397.
310. See, e.g., TIM BROOKS, SURVEY OF REISSUES OF U.S. RECORDINGS 4-14 (2005), available at http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub133/pub133.pdf;
311. Joel Rose, Copyright Laws Severely Limit Availability of Music, NPR.ORG (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId= 5i39522&ft=1&f=2.
312. 17 U.S.C §§ 203, 304(c), 304(d) (2006);
313. see Returning Authors Rights: The CC Termination of Transfer Tool [Beta]: Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS LABS, http://labs.creativecommons. org/demos/termination/faq.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2010);
314. Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under 17 U.S.C § 203, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/203.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
315. U.S. copyright law has since 1831 incorporated provisions designed to allow authors to recapture their copyrights from assignees.
316. See Barbara Ringer, Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963). Until 1976, copyrights expired after an initial term, and the author or the audiors' heirs could apply for a second, "renewal" term, which vested free and clear of initial term assignments. The renewal provisions, however, were unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, authors and their heirs didn't understand the provisions well enough to follow the statutory steps. Second, copyright owners routinely required audiors to assign their renewal expectancies at the same time they made their initial copyright assignment, and courts had upheld the validity of these advance grants. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 383 (1960);
317. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943). That meant that authors as a practical matter were unable to recapture their rights. See Ringer, supra.
318. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b);
319. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 891-93 (1987). Authors of older works have a parallel right to terminate at the beginning of the nineteen-year copyright extension enacted in 1976 and the twenty-year copyright extension enacted in 1988. 17 U.S.C. § 304.
320. See Litman, supra note 169, at 892;
321. Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
322. See Burroughs, 683 F.2d at 620-31;
323. *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2010);
324. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1120 (CD. Cal. 2008).
325. See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1985);
326. Copyright Holder Protection Act: Hearing on S. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on thefudiciary, 99th Cong. 40-42 (1985) (statement of Barbara Ringer);
327. Litman, supra note 169, at 901-02.
328. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2008);
329. Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the "Inalienable" Right To Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611256;
330. Scott, supra note 45.
331. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 67-96, 171-75.
332. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
333. Eldredv. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
334. See NETANEL, supra note 128, at 109-53 (detailing the burdens contemporary copyright law places on free speech).
335. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1895-1919.
336. Id. at 1904-08.
337. The most notorious example is the question whether the law permits consumer copying of recorded music from a CD to a computer or digital playback device. During oral argument in MGM v. Grokster, Petitioner's counsel made the following representation: "The record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it's been on their Website for some time now, that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your computer, put it onto your iPod." Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 832356 at *14. Ten months later, in a filing opposing exemptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, the record companies characterized it somewhat differently: consumers could lawfully copy music to their iPods only because copyright owners had granted them a revocable privilege to do so.
338. See Ass'n of Am. Publishers et al., RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Comments at 22 (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/1lmetalitz-AAP.pdf ("[C]reating a back-up copy of a music CD is not a non-infringing use.");
339. id. at 22 n.46 ("Nor does the fact that permission to make a copy in particular circumstances is often or even 'routinely' granted necessarily establish that the copying is a fair use when the copyright owner withholds that authorization. In this regard, the statement attributed to counsel for copyright holders in the Grokster case is simply a statement about authorization, not about fair use." (citations omitted)).
340. See Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65-67.
341. See LlTMAN, supra note 2, at 116-17.
342. See A Special Conversation with Marybeth Peters, supra note 13.
343. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 114, at 199-258 (proposing alternative system for compensating creators);
344. ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 69-85, 147-65 (2010) (proposing expansion of moral rights) LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD 250-59 (2001) (proposing short renewable copyright terms, new compulsory licenses, and absolving defendants of liability if they can prove lack of harm to the copyright owner);
345. NETANEL, supra note 128, at 195-217 (proposing reforms to facilitate use and preservation of orphan works and a noncommercial use levy to compensating copyright owners for noncommercial peer-to-peer file sharing);
346. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1122 (2007) (proposing an administrative body with authority to adjudicate fair use petitions and issue fair use rulings);
347. Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286-88, 301-06 (proposing copyright amendment giving human creators waivable attribution rights);
348. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1410 (2004) (proposing streamlined administrative dispute resolution for small claims against consumers engaging in infringement over peer-to-peer networks);
349. Loren, supra note 88, at 703 (proposing replacing six exclusive rights with single "'right to commercially exploit' the copyrighted expression");
350. R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 268-73 (2001) (proposing legislation to extend existing compulsory licenses and exemptions to temporary RAM storage incidental to licensed or exempt uses);
351. Samuelson, supra note 114, at 556 (outlining the provisions of a model copyright law);
352. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 497-510 (2009) (proposing amendments to copyright damages provisions);
353. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(altz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 551 (2004) (proposing the adoption of "new style" 2fern#compliant formalities); Stadler, supra note 67, at 746-57 (proposing amendments to narrow the scope of the public performance right).
354. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
355. 17 U.S.C.§ 201(d).
356. The canonical example is music, where the public performance rights are licensed by performing rights societies, like ASCAP, while music publishers control the reproduction and distribution rights.
357. See PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 206-38.
358. See generally Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78.
359. To stick with the music example, ASCAP insists that both transmission of a file containing recorded music over the Internet and the playing of a music ring-tone on a cellular phone should be deemed public performances within its purview. Music publishers insist that the transmission of the files and the sales of ringtones to cell-phone subscribers are not performances but distributions of copies.
360. See United States v. ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
361. United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Companies have learned to their peril that licensing the use from one is no defense to a suit for willful copyright infringement by the other.
362. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (2003).
363. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 88, at 550-62;
364. Reese, supra note 184, at 240-49.
365. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2008), cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009);
366. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 811, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2003);
367. ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 565;
368. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
369. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 106-44 (testimony of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights).
370. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61-65 (1976)
371. See, e.g., Kelly, 280 F.gd at 940-44, 947-48;
372. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir- 2001).
373. Justice Ginsburg suggested as much in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 494-97 (2001).
374. See Loren, supra note 88, at 698-701.
375. I have argued elsewhere that replacing the current exclusive rights with a right of commercial exploitation would improve the copyright law.
376. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 180-86;
377. accord Loren, supra note 88, at 717-18.
378. In addition to exclusive reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, and public display rights, the current statute gives differently defined public performance rights for sound recording copyrights and copyrights other than sound recordings.
379. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6) (2006). Authors of works of visual arts have separate, inalienable attribution and integrity rights.
380. See id. % 106A.
381. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'LL. & POL. 237, 253 (1997);
382. Litman, supra note 55, at 1912.
383. Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 293-96, 335-37, 385-95.
384. E.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.L. REV. 975, 1017-29 (2002).
385. E.g., FlSHER, supra note 114;
386. Netanel, supra note 114.
387. See, e.g., Patrick Ross, Live from Digital Hollywood: The Canary is Spain, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOC (May 5, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://blog. copyrightalliance.org/2010/05/live-from-digital-hollywood-the-canary-is-spain/;
388. Patrick Ross, Seven Sneaky Words on Fair Use, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (Mar. io, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2010/03/seven- sneaky-words-on-fair-use/;
389. Thomas D. Sydnor II, Thomas on Copyright Reform: An Injudicious Threat to Consumers and Artists, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash, D.C.), Dec. 2008, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15. 18thomasreform.pdf.
390. See, e.g., CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING "NON-COMMERCIAL": A STUDY OF HOW THE ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS "NON-COMMERCIAL USE" 11 (2009), available at http:// mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/ Defining-Noncommercial-fullreport. pdf (reporting that both creators and users consider uses that earn money or involve advertising as commercial, but that there is "more uncertainty dian clarity" about whether other online uses are commercial);
391. cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving Role of "For Profit" Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 255, 269-80 (2010) (describing courts' efforts to construe the "for profit" limitation in the 1909 Act).
392. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1904-07.
393. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,27-34 (2005)
394. See, e.g., PAT AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIV., THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT 8 (2007), available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/bitstream/1961/4612/1/good-bad- confusing.pdf;
395. MARY MADDEN PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET 75-77 (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2004/
396. Cf. Loren, supra note 203, at 281-84 (suggesting that the scope of copyright's exclusive rights should be limited by requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendant's use caused "commercial harm").
397. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 8-9, 11-14, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27. We are already arguably in breach of our treaty obligations because of our failure to grant authors meaningful attribution and integrity rights and our generous exemption for bars and restaurant to play music without getting a license to do so. SaGervais, supra note 205, at 14-16;
398. Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 265-66.
399. See, e.g., Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 385-95.
400. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908);
401. Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
402. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001);
403. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
404. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
405. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998);
406. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994);
407. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
408. Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2007).
409. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1917.
410. It may once have been the case that it was easier to track down a work's publisher than to find its author. In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each other's divisions, spin off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying rate, an author is now far easier to track down than her assorted assignees, their successors, and their respective assignees. It also seems more likely that an author will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher than that a publisher will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when it purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the authors' contracts. See, e.g., PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOURT, DIGITAL MUSIC WARS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 24-37 (Andrew Calabrese ed., 2006);
411. ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 51-65 (2d ed. 2005). Thus, plaintiff record companies in Napster insisted that it would be difficult or impossible for them to identify the works on whose behalf they brought suit A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
412. Eg., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
413. E.g., id. §§ 111, 112, 114, 119.
414. See Jonathan Band, Publish and Perish? Protecting Your Copyrights from Your Publisher, ASCB NEWSLETTER, (Am. Soc'y for Cell Biology, Bediesda, Md.), May 2008, available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/20080523- PublishANDPerishFinal.pdf;
415. Comments of Recording Artist Groups on Orphan Works, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Mar. 25, 2005), http://futureof music.org/filing/comments-recording- artist-groups-orphan-works.
416. See generally KEEP YOUR COPYRIGHTS, http://www.keepyourcopyrights.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
417. Other scholars have proposed different reforms that would be useful contributions to efforts to strengthen the perceived connection between creators and their copyrights, such as enacting an express attribution right.
418. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286-88.
419. That probably won't prevent some assignees from seeking to avoid termination by claiming that the works are works made for hire.
420. See, e.g., Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106 th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights). In order to safeguard authors' opportunities to exercise their broadened termination rights, we should probably narrow and perhaps eliminate the category of commissioned works made for hire under the second prong of the definition in § 101.
421. See Litman, supra note 66, at 179-83.
422. See Litman, supra note 153, at 53-54;
423. Litman, supra note 9, at 299-301, 311-16.
424. Compare, e.g., Neil Turkewitz, Copyright, Fair Use and the Public Interest, CULTURAL COMMONS (Dec. 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/ 20050831033648/www.cultural commons.org/comment-print.cfm?ID=22, with, e.g., PATRY, supra note 30, at 101-02.
425. For example, a sports bar publicly performs games broadcast by ABC. The performance of the music accompanying the broadcast is exempt under 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006).
426. For example, the local ABC affiliate broadcasts the game to viewers in its local service area, having secured blanket performance licenses from ASCAP, BMI and SESAC to broadcast the music accompanying the game.
427. For example, Comcast Cablevision transmits the ABC broadcast to its subscribers, having paid a statutory license fee under 17 U.S.C. § 111 to permit its retransmission. The fee will be combined widi other fees and then divided at the end of the year between motion picture studios, major sports leagues, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC, and others who claim copyright ownership in programming transmitted over cable under the § 111 license.
428. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805;
429. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Cong., 146 F.3d 907, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1998). A similar regime applies to satellite television.
430. See 17 U.S.C. § 119. A dissimilar and horribly complex regime covers the digital transmission of recorded music by satellite radio and Internet webcasters.
431. See id. §§ 114, 115;
432. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
433. See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 275-77 (2009);
434. Loren, supra note 88.
435. See generally Licensing Information, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 17,2010) (providing information and forms related to licensing).
436. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 218-36;
437. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217;
438. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
439. The performing rights organizations divide royalties among their members according to each organization's secret formula. Most of the compulsory license royalties are, in theory, allocated among claimants by copyright royalty judges. The statutory sections that call for license fees to be paid into a common fund and then divided among claimants don't include provisions that would assist the copyright royalty judges charged widi disbursing the royalties to allocate the funds in the pot. Rather, the statute encourages claimants to negotiate among themselves to arrive at both the royalty rates and a division that they find satisfactory.
440. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 112(e)(2), 114(e), 118(b)(2), 119(c), 803(b)(3), 805, 1007. In the three decades since the 1976 act took effect, copyright owner claimants have pursued a strategy of driving the cost of claiming a share up to levels diat discourage claimants unless they are represented by collecting societies or big trade associations, and then negotiating widi the remaining big fish to divide the spoils.
441. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 106-44 (testimony of Mary Bedi Peters);
442. Loren, supra note 88.
443. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001);
444. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
445. see Crane, supra note 226.
446. see License Your Work, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ choose/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
447. See CCPlus, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Ccplus (last visited Sept. 17, 2010);
448. Metadata Lab, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://labs.creativecommons.org/demos/ metadata/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
449. Such conditions might include provisions that collecting agents may administer only nonexclusive rights, must accept as members anyone who seeks membership and allow any current member to defect to a competitor, must offer per use as well as blanket licenses, must make lists of works they license readily available to public, and must make the terms of division and payment readily available to both members and licensees.
450. See Litman, supra note 88, at 43-44.
451. Keith Kupferschmid, Are Authors and Publishers Getting Scroogled?, INFORMATION TODAY, Dec. 1, 2005, 2005 WLNR 22457424;
452. see Edward Wyatt, Google Library Database Is Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at Bg (quoting Patricia Schroeder, President of the Association of American Publishers).
453. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 133-35 (2004);
454. see also Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term (June 15, 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/optimal-copyright-term.pdf.
455. See FlSHER, supra note 114, at 248-49.
456. E.g., id.;
457. KWALL, supra note 184;
458. Gervais, supra note 23;
459. Ginsburg, supra note 64;
460. LESS1G, supra note 237;
461. Netanel, supra note 114;
462. Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 114;
463. Samuelson, supra note 114;
464. Sprigman, supra note 184.
465. Accord Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1 (2008);
466. Samuelson, supra note 114;
467. Lawrence Lessig, Required Reading: The Next 10 Years, LESSIG 2.0 (June 19, 2007, 2:07 AM), http://lessig.org/blog/2007/06/required-reading-the-next-10- y-1.html.
468. Turkewitz, supra note 222;
469. see, e.g., HELPR1N, supra note 65, at xiv-xv, 33-39;
470. James V. Delong, Defending Intellectual Property, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17, 17-18 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews.Jr. eds., 2002).
471. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xiv, 99-100, 216-17;
472. Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information Era, in THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: TWENTY YEARS OF CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL (Peter K. Yu ed., 2002).
473. See, e.g., Thomas D. Sydnor II, Tragedy and Farce: An Analysis of the Book Free Culture, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash, D.C.) Apr. 2008, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop15. 5freecultureanalys.pdf.
474. See, e.g., Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 23-26 (2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ hearings/pdf/Carneso80311.pdf (testimony of Rick Cames, President, Songwriters Guild of America).
475. E.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xii-xiii, 33-39, 51-55;
476. Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 679. The phrase, attributed by Wikipedia to Stewart Brand, author of the Whole Earth Catalog, took on new meaning as a challenge to copyright when John Perry Barlow repurposed it in his essay, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age. (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property Is Wrong.), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 89.
477. HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 214;
478. Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 689.
479. A single example that I think is more sad than offensive: Noted novelist Mark Helprin published a book-lengui hysterical screed last year that purports to expose an anti-copyright conspiracy, but is primarily an ad hominem attack on Larry Lessig and the Creative Commons. HELPRIN, supra note 65. Lessig responded with an anguished book review posted to the Huffington Post.
480. See Lawrence Lessig, The Solipsist and the Internet (A Review ofHelprin's Digital Barbarism), HUFFINGTON POST (May ao, 2009, 05:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ lawrence-lessig/the-solipsist-and-the-intJuaoeoa 1 .html. From my vantage point as a copyright criticizer and Lessig friend, Helprin's book seems delusional; from Helprin's viewpoint though, I and other scholars like me are either communist conspirators or thralls.