Governing budgetary commons: What can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 201-221

  Raudla, Ringa ^a  

^a TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Estonia)

Author keywords

Budgetary institutions; Constitutional economics; Constitutional law and economics; Fiscal commons; Institutional economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149497961     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9187-6     Document Type: Article

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