Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 253-273

  Alesina, Alberto ^a   Hausmann, Ricardo ^b   Hommes, Rudolf ^c   Stein, Ernesto ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Budget institutions; Fiscal deficits

Indexed keywords

BUDGET DEFICIT; DEBT; NATIONAL ECONOMY;

CARIBBEAN ISLANDS; CENTRAL AMERICA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 0033180449     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00012-7     Document Type: Article

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