The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 338-359

  Hallerberg, Mark ^a   Strauch, Rolf ^b   von Hagen, Jürgen ^c,d,e  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^d CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^e INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budgetary procedures; European public finances; Fiscal rules; Public indebtedness

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248670147     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005     Document Type: Article

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