Coping with tragedies of the commons

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 2, Issue , 1999, Pages 493-535

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adaptive systems; Fisheries; Forestry; Irrigation; Polycentricity; Rational choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033473467     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.493     Document Type: Article

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