The welfare state as a fiscal commons: Problems of incentives versus problems of cognition

Public Finance Review

Volumn 30, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 481-508

  Jakee, Keith ^a   Turner, Stephen ^b  

^a RMIT UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036998535     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/109114202237999     Document Type: Conference Paper

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