A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union

Public Choice

Volumn 130, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 401-436

  Lagona, Francesco ^a   Padovano, Fabio ^a  

^a ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Budget rules; Fiscal performance; Nonlinear principal components

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847292302     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9095-z     Document Type: Article

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