Developing a method for analyzing institutional change

Alternative Institutional Structures: Evolution and Impact

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 48-76

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a,b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911063275     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203894439     Document Type: Chapter

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