Legislative organization and government spending: Cross-country evidence

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 309-325

  Bradbury, John Charles ^a   Crain, W Mark ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH GEORGIA   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bicameralism; Government spending; Law of 1 n; Logrolling; National legislatures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035650210     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00150-X     Document Type: Article

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