Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Caribbean countries

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 571-587

  Hallerberg, Mark ^a   Marier, Patrik ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ÉCOLE NATIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242801307     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x     Document Type: Article

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