Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes

American Economic Review

Volumn 94, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 25-45

  Persson, Torsten ^a,b   Tabellini, Guido ^c  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442638906     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282804322970689     Document Type: Article

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