Fragmented fiscal policy

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 191-222

  Perotti, Roberto ^a   Kontopoulos, Yianos ^b  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b Merrill Lynch   (United States)

Author keywords

Fiscal policy; Fragmentation; Ideology

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036837357     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00146-3     Document Type: Article

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